Although central to attachment theory, internal working models remain a useful heuristic in need of concretization. We compared the selective attention of organized and disorganized mothers using the emotional Stroop task. Both disorganized attachment and emotional Stroop response involve the coordination of strongly conflicting motivations under conditions of emotional arousal. Furthermore, much is known about the cognitive and neuromodulatory correlates of the Stroop that may inform attempts to substantiate the internal working model construct. We assessed 47 community mothers with the Adult Attachment Interview and the Working Model of the Child Interview in the third trimester of pregnancy. At 6 and 12 months postpartum, we assessed mothers with emotional Stroop tasks involving neutral, attachment, and emotion conditions. At 12 months, we observed their infants in the Strange Situation. Results showed that: disorganized attachment is related to relative Stroop reaction time, that is, unlike organized mothers, disorganized mothers respond to negative attachment/emotion stimuli more slowly than to neutral stimuli; relative speed of response is positively related to number of times the dyad was classified disorganized, and change in relative Stroop response time from 6 to 12 months is related to the match-mismatch status of mother and infant attachment classifications. We discuss implications in terms of automatic and controlled processing and, more specifically, cognitive threat tags, parallel distributed processing, and neuromodulation through norepinephrine and dopamine.

Subjects saw or heard words in a list (e.g. limerick) and then took two successive tests. The first was a yes/no recognition test in which auditory/visual modality of test words was manipulated orthogonally to the study modality. The second test varied with experimental conditions: subjects produced words to either perceptual (fragment) cues (l- -e-ick) or conceptual cues (What name is given to a lighthearted five-line poem?), under either explicit or implicit retrieval instructions. The major findings were: (a) that regardless of the type of retrieval cue (perceptual or conceptual) the degree of dependency between recognition and cued recall was greater than that between recognition and implicit retrieval; and (b) that modality shifts adversely affected perceptually cued explicit and implicit retrieval, whereas they had no effect either on conceptually cued retrieval or on recognition. These results suggest that the memory system subserving, and the processes involved in, conceptual priming differ from those underlying recognition and perceptual priming.

PHILOSOPHY translation is good and very readable, but there are a certain number of places where he would have done better to follow the original more carefully.