ABSTRACT:In Political Liberalism John Rawls argues that "the reasonable" and "the rational" are "two distinct and independent" ideas. This differentiation is essential to the viability of Rawls' conception of political liberalism insofar as it facilitates the recognition and subsequent voluntary acceptance of the need for a public conception of justice that requires all individuals to forsake the unfettered pursuit of their personal ambitions. However, the soundness of Rawls' argument is premised upon a number of questionable claims that, in effect, render his proposed distinction between the reasonable and the rational more chimerical than real, and in so doing critically undermine the ability of his conception of justice to secure the type of voluntary public consensus he deems necessary to establish and sustain a just and stable liberal democracy. It is concluded that the only way one can be assured of generating the sought after conditions is to develop a regulatory framework that publicly supports and protects the principles embodied in Rawls' conception of reasonableness, rather than relying upon the reasonableness of individuals to secure and nourish the required conditions.In Political Liberalism John Rawls (1993: 51) argues that "the reasonable" and "the rational" are "two distinct and independent" ideas. This differentiation is critical to the viability of his conception of political liberalism: It allows him to claim that individuals can effectively distinguish between what is "reasonable" and what is "rational," which, in turn, enables them to recognize the value and, indeed, necessity of adopting and supporting a public conception of justice 1 that requires all individuals to forsake the unfettered pursuit of their personal ambitions. Given the ineliminable diversity of reasonable moral, religious, and philosophical beliefs that characterizes contemporary liberal democracies-that is, the fact of reasonable pluralism-such recognition is essential if Rawlsian political liberalism is to provide for the establishment and preservation of the sociopolitical conditions necessary to secure and sustain a just and stable (in Rawlsian terms, well-ordered) liberal polity.However, the viability of Rawls' argument is premised upon a number of questionable claims that, in effect, render his proposed distinction between the reasonable and the rational more chimerical than real. In particular, when one penetrates the surface of Rawls' argument, it becomes clear that in a society governed by the principles of Rawlsian political liberalism a person's goals and related behavior can be considered genuinely rational only to the extent that they qualify as reasonable. If, as Rawls contends, a person's public behavior must be reasonable if it is to be legitimately accommodated, protected, and facilitated, then maximizing one's potential to achieve her *
Abstract.The notion of “reasonableness” has been a prominent feature of liberalism since the latter first emerged as a coherent philosophical project. Indeed, arguably, reasonableness is the core value animating the liberal outlook. Such a claim is especially true with respect to the conception of political liberalism promoted by John Rawls. In essence, the viability of Rawlsian political liberalism is dependent upon the “reasonableness” of both the public conception of justice and the individuals who must live under its constraints. However, this reliance on reasonableness poses a number of potential difficulties for Rawls's argument, particularly insofar as his belief in the ability of his conception to secure the conditions essential to establishing and sustaining a just and stable liberal democracy is premised upon a number of questionable claims and expectations regarding the reasonableness of individual attitudes and behaviour. The primary task of this essay is to identify and explain a number of concerns that render suspect the plausibility of Rawls's conclusions regarding the extent to which it is realistic to presume the reasonableness of individuals and, by extension, the ability of his conception to achieve its stated goal.Résumé.La notion du “ raisonnable ” constitue un aspect important du libéralisme depuis l'émergence de ce dernier en tant que projet philosophique cohérent. En fait, le raisonnable est sans doute la valeur principale qui anime le point de vue libéral. Ceci est particulièrement vrai de la conception du libéralisme politique défendue par John Rawls. Le libéralisme politique de Rawls dépend essentiellement du caractère raisonnable de la conception publique de la justice, ainsi que des individus qui doivent vivre selon ses contraintes. Toutefois, l'importance du raisonnable dans ce concept soulève un certain nombre de problèmes dans le raisonnement de Rawls. Il est persuadé que ses idées garantissent les conditions essentielles pour établir et maintenir une démocratie libérale, mais ce postulat s'appuie sur de nombreuses affirmations et espérances discutables quant au caractère raisonnable des attitudes et comportements individuels. Cette dissertation s'efforcera principalement d'identifier et d'expliquer un certain nombre de problèmes remettant en cause la plausibilité des conclusions de Rawls. On étudiera tout particulièrement dans quelle mesure il est réaliste de présumer du caractère raisonnable des individus et, par extension, de la capacité de la conception de Rawls à atteindre ses objectifs.
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