Feminist philosophy of science appears to present problems for the ideal of value‐free science. These difficulties also challenge a traditional understanding of the objectivity of science. However, feminist philosophers of science have good reasons for desiring to retain some concept of objectivity. The present essay considers several recent and influential feminist approaches to the role of social and political values in science, with particular focus on feminist empiricism and feminist standpoint theory. The similarities and difference, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches are explored. The essay concludes with suggestions for future research in the area of feminist epistemology and philosophy of science.

Like most questions, the title of the session on which this collection of papers is based delineates a particular set of options and shapes the space of possible answers. 1 In this sense, it is a loaded question that reflects the shift in focus as standpoint theory has been revisited in recent literature. As Janet Kourany notes in her contribution, the question is not whether standpoint theory is the resource for feminist epistemology; the question is whether, and if so how, it might be a resource to serve the goals of feminist epistemology successfully. Sandra Harding's anthology, The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader, both documented and fueled this shift (Harding 2004). The fundamental ideas underlying the more recent conversation about standpoint theory begin with its successes as a methodology, particularly in the social sciences. These successes strongly suggest that there is something worth exploring in standpoint theory, even if it is not possible to develop it fully as a feminist epistemology. Some of these successes also raise questions about knowledge production in the sciences more generally and thus about the broader implications of feminist epistemology and research. 2 Each of the contributors to this collection has responded to the title question affirmatively, although not without ambivalence. Each offers suggestions for how standpoint theory might be a resource for feminist epistemology and philosophy of science while at the same time indicating its limits.In her contribution, Harding notes, ''It is reflection on its [standpoint theory's] uses in feminist research . . . that informed its initial formulations as an epistemology and philosophy of science'' (emphasis added). Harding notes that this makes the philosophical version of standpoint theory a naturalized epistemology. However, as Harding now sees it, this abstract version of standpoint theory becomes controversial in part because of the diversity of its uses as a logic of inquiry. Rather than resolving these controversies through further abstraction, Harding welcomes the controversies as a means of furthering feminist knowledge projects. For Harding, the plurality of standpoint theories and the controversies to which they give rise are themselves a resource for feminist epistemology.

Political science research, particularly in international relations and comparative politics, has increasingly become dominated by statistical and formal approaches. The promise of these approaches shifted the methodological emphasis away from case study research. In response, supporters of case study research argue that case studies provide evidence for causal claims that is not available through statistical and formal research methods, and many have advocated multimethod research. I propose a way of understanding the integration of multiple methodologies in which the causes sought in case studies are treated as singular causation and contingent on a theoretical framework.

Feminist philosophy of science has been criticized on several counts. On the one hand, it is claimed that it results in relativism of the worst sort since the political commitment to feminism is prima facie incompatible with scientific objectivity. On the other hand, when critics acknowledge that there may be some value in work that feminists have done, they comment that there is nothing particularly feminist about their accounts. I argue that both criticisms can be addressed through a better understanding of the current work in feminist epistemology. I offer an examination of standpoint theory as an illustration. Harding and Wylie have suggested ways in which the objectivity question can be addressed. These two accounts together with a third approach, 'model-based objectivity', indicate there is a clear sense in which we can understand how a standpoint theory both contributes to a better understanding of scientific knowledge and can provide a feminist epistemology.

No abstract