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The purpose of this study is two-fold. The first is to consider supplier's and retailer's trade-credit policy for fixed lifetime products and the second is to extend Mahata's 2012 model with time varying deterioration where Mahata (Expert Syst Appl 39(3): 3537-3550, 2012) wrote exponential deterioration but actually he considered constant deterioration. We assume that the suppliers offer full trade-credit to retailers but retailers offer partial trade-credit to their customers. Some numerical examples along with graphical representations are given to illustrate the model.

Due to heavy transportation for single-setup multidelivery (SSMD) policy in supply chain management, this model assumes carbon emission cost to obtain a realistic behavior for world environment. The transportation for buyer and vendor is considered along with setup cost reduction by using an investment function. It is assumed that the shipment lot size of each delivery is unequal and variable. The buyer inspects all received products and returns defective items to vendor for reworking process. Because of this policy, end customers will only obtain nondefective items. The analytical optimization is considered to obtain the optimum solution of the model. The main goal of this paper is to reduce the total cost by considering carbon emission during the transportation. A numerical example, graphical representation, and sensitivity analysis are given to illustrate the model.

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This paper formulates an integrated inventory model that allows Stackelberg game policy for optimizing joint total cost of a vendor and buyer system. After receiving the lot, the buyer commences an inspection process to determine the defective items. All defective items the buyer sends to vendor during the receiving of the next lot. Due to increasing number of shipments fixed and variable transportation, as well as carbon emissions, are considered, which makes the model sustainable integrated model forever. To reduce the setup cost for the vendor, a discrete setup reduction is considered for maximization more profit. The players of the integrated model are with unequal power (as leader and follower) and the Stackelberg game strategy is utilized to solve this model for obtaining global optimum solution over the finite planning horizon. An illustrative numerical example is given to understand this model clearly.