Social responsibility is essential to the sustainable development of megaprojects. A transparent and symmetrical information-sharing mechanism is an important guarantee for promoting megaproject stakeholders to fulfill their social responsibilities and improve project efficiency. Aiming at the problems of megaproject subcontractors concealing social responsibility information, which leads to unsmooth information channels and low project efficiency, this paper compares and analyzes the single-stage revenue-sharing model under symmetric and asymmetric information from the perspective of incentive contract design. Then, a two-stage incentive contract with multiple indicators under asymmetric information is designed using principal-agent theory. The research results show that the social responsibility effort level of the general contractor and the total project revenue is positively correlated with the input–output ratio, and is negatively correlated with the degree of information opacity of the subcontractor’s social responsibility. Incentive contracts with multiple indicators in stages can effectively encourage subcontractors to disclose social responsibility information, and reduce information asymmetry, therefore enhancing social responsibility and improving overall project efficiency. This research transforms the research on the social responsibility of megaprojects from qualitative to quantitative. The research results provide theoretical methods and decision-making basis for megaproject general contractors to encourage subcontractors to improve social responsibility.
Due to the unreasonable structure of overseas oil and gas resources and the lack of resource optimization strategy will seriously affect the stable development of oil companies in the global field, it is an urgent problem for oil companies to provide scientific and rapid optimization solutions to meet the resource allocation objectives for managers. In view of the lack of multi-stage dynamic planning model for overseas oil and gas resource structure optimization allocation, based on the operational research theory, according to the resource characteristics of overseas oil and gas projects, a dynamic programming mathematical model is established in this paper, which aims at the allocation of resource structure. It is solved by genetic algorithm, and realized by programming with MATLAB language. This study provides a new way and method for optimizing the allocation of overseas oil and gas resources.
Our motivation to study the production substitution between the products come from the firms’ practice. A significant issue to the firms is the effective balance of setup and substitution cost. Since the firms can adjust the operation policy to lower the setup and substitution costs or both, the operation manager would like to know how best to make the adjustment. Given this, we consider a class of dynamic lot sizing problems with one-way and two-way product substitution under durable and perishable products. According to some structural properties in an optimal solution, we devise a forward dynamic programming algorithm to work out the problem with two durable products in polynomial time, and develop an efficient approximate dynamic programming algorithm to solve the problem with multiple perishable products. Finally, on a comprehensive test bed, we gain some useful insights on the impact of substitution on the total costs. The effectiveness of the approximate algorithm is also tested.
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