Recent events have shown that sovereigns, just like banks, can be subject to runs, highlighting the importance of the investor base for their liabilities. This paper proposes a methodology for compiling internationally comparable estimates of investor holdings of sovereign debt. Based on this methodology, it introduces a dataset for 24 major advanced economies that can be used to track US$42 trillion of sovereign debt holdings on a quarterly basis over 2004-11. While recent outflows from euro periphery countries have received wide attention, most sovereign borrowers have continued to increase reliance on foreign investors. This may have helped reduce borrowing costs, but it can imply higher refinancing risks going forward. Meanwhile, advanced economy banks' exposure to their own government debt has begun to increase across the board after the global financial crisis, strengthening sovereign-bank linkages. In light of these risks, the paper proposes a frameworksovereign funding shock scenarios (FSS)-to conduct forward-looking analysis to assess sovereigns' vulnerability to sudden investor outflows, which can be used along with standard debt sustainability analyses (DSA). It also introduces two risk indices-investor base risk index (IRI) and foreign investor position index (FIPI)-to assess sovereigns' vulnerability to shifts in investor behavior.

This paper proposes an approach to track US$1 trillion of emerging market government debt held by foreign investors in local and hard currency, based on a similar approach that was used for advanced economies (Arslanalp and Tsuda, 2012). The estimates are constructed on a quarterly basis from 2004 to mid-2013 and are available along with the paper in an online dataset. We estimate that about half a trillion dollars of foreign flows went into emerging market government debt during 2010-12, mostly coming from foreign asset managers. Foreign central bank holdings have risen as well, but remain concentrated in a few countries: Brazil, China, Indonesia, Poland, Malaysia, Mexico, and South Africa. We also find that foreign investor flows to emerging markets were less differentiated during 2010-12 against the background of near-zero interest rates in advanced economies. The paper extends some of the indicators proposed in our earlier paper to show how the investor base data can be used to assess countries' sensitivity to external funding shocks and to track foreign investors' exposures to different markets within a global benchmark portfolio. JEL Classification Numbers: F3, G01, G11

When developing countries announce debt relief agreements under the Brady Plan, their stock markets appreciate by an average of 60% in real dollar terms-a $42 billion increase in shareholder value. There is no significant stock market increase for a control group of countries that do not sign Brady agreements. The stock market appreciations successfully forecast higher future resource transfers, investment, and growth. Since the market capitalization of U.S. commercial banks with developing country loan exposure also rises-by $13 billion-the results suggest that both borrower and lenders can benefit from debt relief when the borrower suffers from debt overhang. Copyright 2005 by The American Finance Association.

Asset allocation decisions of international investors are at the core of capital fl ows. This paper explores the impact of these decisions on long-term government bond yields, using a quarterly investor base dataset for 22 advanced economies over 2004-2012. We fi nd that a one percentage point increase in the share of government debt held by foreign investors can explain a 6-10 basis point reduction in long-term sovereign bond yields over the sample period. Accordingly, international fl ows to core advanced economy bond markets over 2008-12 are estimated to have reduced 10-year government bond yields by 40-65 basis points in Germany, 20-30 basis points in the U.K., and 35-60 basis points in the U.S. In contrast, foreign outfl ows are estimated to have raised 10-year government bond yields by 40-70 basis points in Italy and 110-180 basis points in Spain during the same period. These results suggest that changes in the foreign investor base for sovereign debt can have economically and statistically signifi cant effects on sovereign bond yields, independent of other standard macroeconomic determinants of bond yields.

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