ABSTRACT. In 1990, Elinor Ostrom proposed eight design principles, positing them to characterize robust institutions for managing common-pool resources such as forests or fisheries. Since then, many studies have explicitly or implicitly evaluated these design principles. We analyzed 91 such studies to evaluate the principles empirically and to consider what theoretical issues have arisen since their introduction. We found that the principles are well supported empirically and that several important theoretical issues warrant discussion. We provide a reformulation of the design principles, drawing from commonalities found in the studies.

The action situation is a core component of actor-centered institutional analysis of natural resource governance. Institutional analysis frameworks have been extended to observe multiple situations structured into networks. If further operationalized, this extension can improve policy diagnosis of human–environmental interactions. This paper proposes two complementary ways to move in that direction. First, we propose the use of qualitative configurational analysis and game theory to study the interactions between situations and assess the contribution of each to a desired outcome. Second, we draw on centrality measures to assess the benefits and risks of implementing policies that aim to change the equilibria in action situations. Both analytical strategies are applied to two cases involving irrigation and energy governance. In the Spanish case, centrality of the water allocation situation justifies a configuration of drought measures that also tackle cooperation in monitoring and infrastructure maintenance. In the Indian case, groundwater governance and adequate infrastructure capacity provision are necessary preconditions to enable coordinated technology adoption, which facilitates incentives for regulated irrigation. In both the cases, some action situations’ positive outcomes are necessary in every configuration to guarantee optimal equilibria in the network. In the context of energy-fed irrigation systems, the proposed analytical strategies permit integrating interactions between water use, energy use and food production decisions in policy diagnoses. The analysis can be extended to identify archetypes, network closure, as well as structural and functional connectivity of networks in social-ecological systems.

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Lasting community-based governance of common-pool resources depends on communities self-organizing to monitor compliance with rules. Monitoring serves an important function in community-based governance by establishing conditions for long-term cooperation, but the factors that foster its provision are poorly understood. We have analysed data from 177 forest user groups to assess the relative importance of 15 potential drivers of compliance monitoring, as well as the direction and form of their relationships. The results suggest that user groups are most likely to successfully self-organize to monitor compliance when rules are designed by local user groups (local rulemaking), and when those user groups are located close to or far from markets for forest products and have a larger number of members. Additionally, local leadership plays an important role in certain contexts, such as groups that are smaller in size and located near markets for forest products.