We analyse the extent to which prices in the sovereign credit default swap (CDS) and bond markets reflect the same information on credit risk in the context of the current crisis of the European Monetary Union (EMU). We first document that deviations between CDS and bond spreads are related to counterparty risk, common volatility in EMU equity markets, market illiquidity, funding costs, flight-to-quality, and the volume of debt purchases by the European Central Bank (ECB) in the secondary market. Based on this we conduct a state-dependent price-discovery analysis that reveals that the levels of the counterparty risk and the common volatility in EMU equity markets, and the banks' agreements to accept losses on their holdings of Greek bonds impair the ability of the CDS market to lead the price discovery process. On the other hand, the funding costs, the flight-to-quality indicator and the volume of debt purchases by the ECB worsen the efficiency of the bond market. We analyse the extent to which prices in the sovereign credit default swap (CDS) and bond markets reflect the same information on credit risk in the context of the current crisis of the European Monetary Union (EMU). We first document that deviations between CDS and bond spreads are related to counterparty risk, common volatility in EMU equity markets, market illiquidity, funding costs, flight-to-quality, and the volume of debt purchases by the European Central Bank (ECB) in the secondary market. Based on this we conduct a state-dependent price-discovery analysis that reveals that the levels of the counterparty risk and the common volatility in EMU equity markets, and the banks' agreements to accept losses on their holdings of Greek bonds impair the ability of the CDS market to lead the price discovery process. On the other hand, the funding costs, the flight-to-quality indicator and the volume of debt purchases by the ECB worsen the efficiency of the bond market. Óscar

We analyse how the ECB’s purchases of corporate bonds under its Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP) affected the financing of Spanish firms. We first document that the announcement of the CSPP in March 2016 raised firms’ propensity to issue bonds. The flipside was a drop in the demand for bank loans by bond issuers. Around 75% of the drop in loans previously made to debt issuers was redirected to other, smaller non-bond issuing firms. This reallocation process was led by banks with weaker liquidity positions experiencing credit outflows, which extended credit to the same firms they were rationing prior to the CSPP. This positive credit supply shock raised the real investment of non-issuing firms. The concomitant ECB’s Targeted Longer Term Refinancing Operations (TLTRO II) is estimated to have contributed to amplifying the credit-reallocation effect triggered by the CSPP.

The presence of different prices in different databases for the same securities can impair the comparability of research efforts and seriously damage the management decisions based upon such research. In this study we compare the six major sources of corporate Credit Default Swap prices: GFI, Fenics, Reuters EOD, CMA, Markit and JP Morgan, using the most liquid single name 5-year CDS of the components of the leading market indexes, iTraxx (European firms) and CDX (US firms) for the period from 2004 to 2010. We find systematic differences between the data sets implying that deviations from the common trend among prices in the different databases are not purely random but are explained by idiosyncratic factors as well as liquidity, global risk and other trading factors. The lower is the amount of transaction prices available the higher is the deviation among databases. Our results suggest that the CMA database quotes lead the price discovery process in comparison with the quotes provided by other databases. Several robustness tests confirm these results.

This paper studies the impact of the banks' portfolio holdings of financial derivatives on the banks' individual contribution to systemic risk over and above the effect of variables related to size, interconnectedness, substitutability, and other balance sheet information. Using a sample of 91 U.S. bank holding companies from 2002 to 2011, we compare five measures of the banks' contribution to systemic risk and find that the new measure proposed in this study, Net Shapley Value, outperforms the others. Using this measure we find that the banks' holdings of foreign exchange and credit derivatives increase the banks contributions to systemic risk whereas holdings of interest rate derivatives decrease it. Nevertheless, the proportion of non-performing loans over total loans and the leverage ratio have much stronger impact on systemic risk than derivatives holdings. We find that before the subprime crisis credit derivatives decreased systemic risk whereas during the crisis increased it. So, credit derivatives seemed to change their role from shock absorbers to shock issuers. This effect is not observed in the other types of derivatives. María Rodríguez-Moreno Derivatives Holdings and Systemic Risk in the U.S. Banking SectorAbstract This paper studies the impact of the banks' portfolio holdings of financial derivatives on the banks' individual contribution to systemic risk over and above the effect of variables related to size, interconnectedness, substitutability, and other balance sheet information.Using a sample of 91 U.S. bank holding companies from 2002 to 2011, we compare five measures of the banks' contribution to systemic risk and find that the new measure proposed in this study, Net Shapley Value, outperforms the others. Using this measure we find that the banks' holdings of foreign exchange and credit derivatives increase the banks contributions to systemic risk whereas holdings of interest rate derivatives decrease it. Nevertheless, the proportion of non-performing loans over total loans and the leverage ratio have much stronger impact on systemic risk than derivatives holdings.We find that before the subprime crisis credit derivatives decreased systemic risk whereas during the crisis increased it. So, credit derivatives seemed to change their role from shock absorbers to shock issuers. This effect is not observed in the other types of derivatives.

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