Abstract. We describe a new class of attacks on secure microcontrollers and smartcards. Illumination of a target transistor causes it to conduct, thereby inducing a transient fault. Such attacks are practical; they do not even require expensive laser equipment. We have carried them out using a flashgun bought second-hand from a camera store for $30 and with an $8 laser pointer. As an illustration of the power of this attack, we developed techniques to set or reset any individual bit of SRAM in a microcontroller. Unless suitable countermeasures are taken, optical probing may also be used to induce errors in cryptographic computations or protocols, and to disrupt the processor's control flow. It thus provides a powerful extension of existing glitching and fault analysis techniques. This vulnerability may pose a big problem for the industry, similar to those resulting from probing attacks in the mid-1990s and power analysis attacks in the late 1990s. We have therefore developed a technology to block these attacks. We use self-timed dual-rail circuit design techniques whereby a logical 1 or 0 is not encoded by a high or low voltage on a single line, but by (HL) or (LH) on a pair of lines. The combination (HH) signals an alarm, which will typically reset the processor. Circuits can be designed so that singletransistor failures do not lead to security failure. This technology may also make power analysis attacks very much harder too.

This paper is a short summary of the first real world detection of a backdoor in a military grade FPGA. Using an innovative patented technique we were able to detect and analyse in the first documented case of its kind, a backdoor inserted into the Actel/Microsemi ProASIC3 chips for accessing FPGA configuration. The backdoor was found amongst additional JTAG functionality and exists on the silicon itself, it was not present in any firmware loaded onto the chip. Using Pipeline Emission Analysis (PEA), our pioneered technique, we were able to extract the secret key to activate the backdoor, as well as other security keys such as the AES and the Passkey. This way an attacker can extract all the configuration data from the chip, reprogram crypto and access keys, modify low-level silicon features, access unencrypted configuration bitstream or permanently damage the device. Clearly this means the device is wide open to intellectual property (IP) theft, fraud, reprogramming as well as reverse engineering of the design which allows the introduction of a new backdoor or Trojan. Most concerning, it is not possible to patch the backdoor in chips already deployed, meaning those using this family of chips have to accept the fact they can be easily compromised or will have to be physically replaced after a redesign of the silicon itself.

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Abstract-EMV, also known as "Chip and PIN", is the leading system for card payments worldwide. It is used throughout Europe and much of Asia, and is starting to be introduced in North America too. Payment cards contain a chip so they can execute an authentication protocol. This protocol requires point-of-sale (POS) terminals or ATMs to generate a nonce, called the unpredictable number, for each transaction to ensure it is fresh. We have discovered two serious problems: a widespread implementation flaw and a deeper, more difficult to fix flaw with the EMV protocol itself. The first flaw is that some EMV implementers have merely used counters, timestamps or home-grown algorithms to supply this nonce. This exposes them to a "pre-play" attack which is indistinguishable from card cloning from the standpoint of the logs available to the card-issuing bank, and can be carried out even if it is impossible to clone a card physically. Card cloning is the very type of fraud that EMV was supposed to prevent. We describe how we detected the vulnerability, a survey methodology we developed to chart the scope of the weakness, evidence from ATM and terminal experiments in the field, and our implementation of proof-of-concept attacks. We found flaws in widely-used ATMs from the largest manufacturers. We can now explain at least some of the increasing number of frauds in which victims are refused refunds by banks which claim that EMV cards cannot be cloned and that a customer involved in a dispute must therefore be mistaken or complicit. The second problem was exposed by the above work. Independent of the random number quality, there is a protocol failure: the actual random number generated by the terminal can simply be replaced by one the attacker used earlier when capturing an authentication code from the card. This variant of the pre-play attack may be carried out by malware in an ATM or POS terminal, or by a man-in-the-middle between the terminal and the acquirer. We explore the design and implementation mistakes that enabled these flaws to evade detection until now: shortcomings of the EMV specification, of the EMV kernel certification process, of implementation testing, formal analysis, and monitoring customer complaints. Finally we discuss countermeasures. More than a year after our initial responsible disclosure of these flaws to the banks, action has only been taken to mitigate the first of them, while we have seen a likely case of the second in the wild, and the spread of ATM and POS malware is making it ever more of a threat.