In daily social interactions, we need to be able to navigate efficiently through our social environment. According to Dennett (1971), explaining and predicting others’ behavior with reference to mental states (adopting the intentional stance) allows efficient social interaction. Today we also routinely interact with artificial agents: from Apple’s Siri to GPS navigation systems. In the near future, we might start casually interacting with robots. This paper addresses the question of whether adopting the intentional stance can also occur with respect to artificial agents. We propose a new tool to explore if people adopt the intentional stance toward an artificial agent (humanoid robot). The tool consists in a questionnaire that probes participants’ stance by requiring them to choose the likelihood of an explanation (mentalistic vs. mechanistic) of a behavior of a robot iCub depicted in a naturalistic scenario (a sequence of photographs). The results of the first study conducted with this questionnaire showed that although the explanations were somewhat biased toward the mechanistic stance, a substantial number of mentalistic explanations were also given. This suggests that it is possible to induce adoption of the intentional stance toward artificial agents, at least in some contexts.
Gaze behavior of humanoid robots is an efficient mechanism for cueing our spatial orienting, but less is known about the cognitive–affective consequences of robots responding to human directional cues. Here, we examined how the extent to which a humanoid robot (iCub) avatar directed its gaze to the same objects as our participants affected engagement with the robot, subsequent gaze-cueing, and subjective ratings of the robot’s characteristic traits. In a gaze-contingent eyetracking task, participants were asked to indicate a preference for one of two objects with their gaze while an iCub avatar was presented between the object photographs. In one condition, the iCub then shifted its gaze toward the object chosen by a participant in 80% of the trials (joint condition) and in the other condition it looked at the opposite object 80% of the time (disjoint condition). Based on the literature in human–human social cognition, we took the speed with which the participants looked back at the robot as a measure of facilitated reorienting and robot-preference, and found these return saccade onset times to be quicker in the joint condition than in the disjoint condition. As indicated by results from a subsequent gaze-cueing tasks, the gaze-following behavior of the robot had little effect on how our participants responded to gaze cues. Nevertheless, subjective reports suggested that our participants preferred the iCub following participants’ gaze to the one with a disjoint attention behavior, rated it as more human-like and as more likeable. Taken together, our findings show a preference for robots who follow our gaze. Importantly, such subtle differences in gaze behavior are sufficient to influence our perception of humanoid agents, which clearly provides hints about the design of behavioral characteristics of humanoid robots in more naturalistic settings.
The increasing presence of robots in society necessitates a deeper understanding into what attitudes people have toward robots. People may treat robots as mechanistic artifacts or may consider them to be intentional agents. This might result in explaining robots’ behavior as stemming from operations of the mind (intentional interpretation) or as a result of mechanistic design (mechanistic interpretation). Here, we examined whether individual attitudes toward robots can be differentiated on the basis of default neural activity pattern during resting state, measured with electroencephalogram (EEG). Participants observed scenarios in which a humanoid robot was depicted performing various actions embedded in daily contexts. Before they were introduced to the task, we measured their resting state EEG activity. We found that resting state EEG beta activity differentiated people who were later inclined toward interpreting robot behaviors as either mechanistic or intentional. This pattern is similar to the pattern of activity in the default mode network, which was previously demonstrated to have a social role. In addition, gamma activity observed when participants were making decisions about a robot’s behavior indicates a relationship between theory of mind and said attitudes. Thus, we provide evidence that individual biases toward treating robots as either intentional agents or mechanistic artifacts can be detected at the neural level, already in a resting state EEG signal.
Humans interpret and predict others' behaviors by ascribing intentions or beliefs, or in other words, by adopting the intentional stance. Since artificial agents are increasingly populating our daily environments, the question arises whether (and under which conditions) humans would apply the "human model" to understand the behaviors of these new social agents. Thus, in a series of three experiments, we tested whether embedding humans in a social interaction with a humanoid robot either displaying a human-like or machine-like behavior would modulate their initial tendency to adopt the intentional stance. Results showed that indeed humans are more prone to adopt the intentional stance after having interacted with a more socially available and human-like robot, while no modulation of the adoption of the intentional stance emerged toward a mechanistic robot. We conclude that short experiences with humanoid robots presumably inducing a "like-me" impression and social bonding increase the likelihood of adopting the intentional stance.
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