Research on self-compassion, which is defined as being understanding and kind to oneself when confronted with negative experiences, has produced an impressive number of articles in recent years. This research shows that individual differences in self-compassion, as measured by the Self-Compassion Scale (SCS), are positively related to life satisfaction, health and social functioning. However, a critical and systematic test of self-compassion from a personality perspective has not yet conducted so far. In the present study (N = 576), we (i) tested the factor structure of the SCS, (ii) examined the distinctiveness of self-compassion with regard to the five-factor model of personality, focusing on neuroticism, and (iii) tested the incremental predictive power of self-compassion beyond the five-factor model in the context of life satisfaction. Confirmatory factor analyses supported a two-factor plus six facets solution of self-compassion (a positive factor and a negative factor). Additional analyses revealed that the negative factor was redundant with facets of neuroticism (rs ≥ .85), whereas the positive factor had some unique variance left. However, neither the negative factor nor the positive factor could explain substantial incremental variance in life satisfaction beyond neuroticism. Recommendations for how to use the SCS are provided, and the future of research on selfcompassion is discussed.

Divergent thinking (DT) is an important constituent of creativity that captures aspects of fluency and originality. The literature lacks multivariate studies that report relationships between DT and its aspects with relevant covariates, such as cognitive abilities, personality traits (e.g. openness), and insight. In two multivariate studies (N = 152 and N = 298), we evaluate competing measurement models for a variety of DT tests and examine the relationship between DT and established cognitive abilities, personality traits, and insight. A nested factor model with a general DT and a nested originality factor described the data well. In Study 1, DT was moderately related with working memory, fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, and mental speed. In Study 2, we replicate these results and add insight, openness, extraversion, and honesty-humility as covariates. DT was associated with insight, extraversion, and honesty-humility, whereas crystallized intelligence mediated the relationship between openness and DT. In contrast, the nested originality factor (i.e. the specificity of originality tasks beyond other DT tasks) had low variance and was not meaningfully related with any other constructs in the nomological net. We highlight avenues for future research by discussing issues of measurement and scoring.

Intelligence has been declared as a necessary but not sufficient condition for creativity, which was subsequently (erroneously) translated into the so-called threshold hypothesis. This hypothesis predicts a change in the correlation between creativity and intelligence at around 1.33 standard deviations above the population mean. A closer inspection of previous inconclusive results suggests that the heterogeneity is mostly due to the use of suboptimal data analytical procedures. Herein, we applied and compared three methods that allowed us to handle intelligence as a continuous variable. In more detail, we examined the threshold of the creativity-intelligence relation with (a) scatterplots and heteroscedasticity analysis, (b) segmented regression analysis, and (c) local structural equation models in two multivariate studies (N1 = 456; N2 = 438). We found no evidence for the threshold hypothesis of creativity across different analytical procedures in both studies. Given the problematic history of the threshold hypothesis and its unequivocal rejection with appropriate multivariate methods, we recommend the total abandonment of the threshold.

Overclaiming has been described as people's tendency to overestimate their cognitive abilities in general and their knowledge in particular. We discuss four different perspectives on the phenomenon of overclaiming that have been proposed in the research literature: Overclaiming as a result of a) self-enhancement tendencies, b) as a cognitive bias (e.g., hindsight bias, memory bias), c) as proxy for cognitive abilities, and d) as sign of creative engagement. Moreover, we discuss two different scoring methods for an OCQ (signal detection theory vs. familiarity ratings). To distinguish between the different viewpoints of what overclaiming is, we juxtaposed overclaiming, as indicated by claiming familiarity with non-existent terms, with fluid and crystallized intelligence, self-reported knowledge, creativity, faking ability, and personality. Overclaiming was measured with a newly comprised overclaiming questionnaire. Results of several latent variable analyses based upon a multivariate study with 298 participants were: First, overclaiming is neither predicted by honesty-humility nor faking ability and therefore reflects something different than mere self-enhancement tendencies. Second, overclaiming is not predicted by crystallized intelligence, but is highly predictive of self-reported knowledge and, thus, not suitable as an index or a proxy for cognitive abilities. Finally, overclaiming is neither related to divergent thinking and originality, and only moderately predicted by self-reported openness creativity from the HEXACO which means that overclaiming does not reflect creative ability. In sum, our results favor an interpretation of overclaiming as a phenomenon that requires more than self-enhancement motivation, in contrast to the claim that was initially proposed in the literature.

In this paper, we respond to comments by Neff et al. (2018) made about our finding that the negative dimensions of self‐compassion were redundant with facets of neuroticism (rs ≥ 0.85; Pfattheicher et al., 2017) and not incrementally valid. We first provide epistemological guidance for establishing psychological constructs, namely, three hurdles that new constructs must pass: theoretically and empirically sound measurement, discriminant validity, and incremental validity—and then apply these guidelines to the self‐compassion scale. We then outline that the critique of Neff et al. (2018) is contestable. We question their decisions concerning data‐analytic methods that help them to circumvent instead of passing the outlined hurdles. In a reanalysis of the data provided by Neff et al. (2018), we point to several conceptual and psychometric problems and conclude that self‐compassion does not overcome the outlined hurdles. Instead, we show that our initial critique of the self‐compassion scale holds and that its dimensions are best considered facets of neuroticism. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology