This study examines the impact of religion on financial reporting. We predict that firms in religious areas are less likely to engage in financial reporting irregularities because prior research links religiosity to reduced acceptance of unethical business practices. Our results suggest that firms headquartered in areas with strong religious social norms generally experience lower incidences of financial reporting irregularities. We also examine whether religiosity influences managers' methods of managing earnings. Although we find a negative association between religiosity and abnormal accruals, we find a positive association between religiosity and two measures of real earnings management, suggesting that managers in religious areas prefer real earnings management over accruals manipulation. We provide evidence that our results are not driven by firms headquartered in rural areas and conclude that religious social norms represent a mechanism for reducing costly agency conflicts, particularly when other external monitoring is low. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

This study investigates whether the tax-specific industry expertise of the external audit firm influences its clients' level of tax avoidance. Our results suggest that clients purchasing tax services from their external audit firm engage in greater tax avoidance when their external audit firm is a tax expert. Because the external audit firm potentially influences clients' tax avoidance activities via the provision of tax consulting services and the financial statement audit, we also examine whether the overall expertise (i.e., the combined tax and audit expertise) of the external audit firm is associated with tax avoidance. We find that the external audit firm's overall expertise is generally associated with greater tax avoidance, which suggests that overall experts are able to combine their audit and tax expertise to develop tax strategies that benefit clients from both a tax and financial statement perspective. In combination, our results suggest that the tax-specific industry expertise of the external audit firm plays a significant role in its clients' tax avoidance. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the article.

This study investigates whether the agency conflicts inherent in a dual class ownership structure are associated with the level of firms' tax avoidance. Dual class ownership presents a unique agency problem because insiders control a majority of the votes of a firm despite having claims to a minority of the firm's cash flows. We examine the level of tax avoidance for a sample of dual class firms and find that the extent of tax avoidance declines as the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights increases. We also compare the level of tax avoidance of dual class firms to a sample of propensity matched single class firms and find that dual class firms engage in less tax avoidance as the wedge between insiders' voting rights and cash flow rights increases. These findings are consistent with dual class ownership entrenching managers and allowing them to perform at a suboptimal level. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the paper.