Research shows that union inclusion is critical to resisting precariousness, yet the role of institutional power is not adequately addressed. Through an investigation of eight retailers in four countries, this study uniquely examines how inclusive union strategies, cost competition and institutional power interact in different ‘spheres of action’. In the product market sphere, unions struggle to prevent labour cost competition between firms from eroding working conditions. In the production sphere, unions struggle to prevent labour cost competition between workers in a single firm from eroding working conditions. This article finds that multi‐level sources of institutional power are a precursor to effective union inclusion and articulating action towards threats from cost competition. I thereby argue that union efforts to resist precarious work are contingent on access to power from institutions. The article concludes with reflections on how institutional power relates to other forms of power.

This study analyses the impact of union actions on worker well-being. It examines union efforts to reduce emotional exhaustion associated with performance monitoring in call center jobs, drawing on quantitative (N = 1894) and qualitative (interviews and focus groups) data in the United States. Findings suggest that the effective exercise of collective voice, through collective bargaining and activism by union officials, can reduce emotional exhaustion by promoting fair and developmental monitoring practices.

This article analyses the expansion of precarious work in industrialized economies, integrating the welfare regime, risk shift and segmentation literatures. I examine trends in wages, working hours, pensions and healthcare in food retail in Canada, Germany, Sweden and the USA between 1980 and 2016. Precariousness increased in each country, but the form and degree of change differed markedly, reflecting the effects of product market competition, bargaining centralization and labour regulation.

Prescription drugs are the highest single cost component for employees' benefits packages in Canada. While industry literature considers cost-containment for prescription drug costs to be a priority for insurers and employers, the implementation of cost-containment measures for private drug plans in Canada remains more of a myth than a reality. Through 18 semi-structured phone interviews conducted with experts from private sector companies, unions, insurers and plan advisors, this study explores the reasons behind this incapacity to implement cost-containment measures by examining how private sector employers negotiate drug benefit design in unionized settings. Respondents were asked questions on how employee benefits are negotiated; the relationships between the players who influence drug benefit design; the role of these players' strategies in influencing plan design; the broad system that underpins drug benefit design; and the potential for a universal pharmacare program in Canada. The study shows that there is consensus about the need to educate employees and employers, more collaboration and data-sharing between these two sets of players, and for external intervention from government to help transform established norms in terms of private drug plan design.

Artificial intelligence (AI)-based algorithms are increasingly used to monitor employees and to automate management decisions. In this article, we ask how worker representatives adapt traditional collective voice institutions to regulate the adoption and use of these tools in the workplace. Our findings are based on a comparative study of union and works council responses to algorithmic management in contact centres from two similar telecommunications companies in Germany and Norway. In both case studies, worker representatives mobilised collective voice institutions to protect worker privacy and discretion associated with remote monitoring and workforce management technologies. However, they relied on different sources of institutional power, connected to co-determination rights, enforcement of data protection laws, and labour cooperation structures.