PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to review the context, rationale, execution strategies and results of the biggest property sale and leaseback programme Barclays has yet undertaken.Design/methodology/approachThe paper is a review and analysis of Barclays' project documentation plus report and accounts, interviews with key decisionmakers, analysis of external economic and property market data in order to set the strategy choices and results achieved into context.FindingsThe sale and leaseback programme released capital and supported business objectives at a material level for Barclays; it achieved sales values that were at cyclical highs; flexibility in execution allowed additional value to be delivered across changing market conditions; a mixed skills team was critical for success.Originality/valueThe paper documents why the sale and leaseback programme made sense for the organisation and what elements were key to success both as a strategy and through execution. It provides a case study for how a large organisation approached a recent and large‐scale sale and leaseback opportunity across a portfolio of 900‐1,000 properties.
Most commentators have overlooked the impact of Russell on Quine, focusing instead on the influence of Carnap. In what follows, I will argue that the early Quine’s engagement with Russell’s logicism was a crucial stage in the development of his philosophy. More specifically, we can see Quine’s naturalism as developing out of a certain strand of Russell’s thought concerning scientific philosophy. In addition to giving us a better sense of the origins of Quine’s philosophy, this reading also shows how his early work, focusing mostly on technical areas of logic, is deeply related to his later and more famous philosophical views. In particular, his reworking of Principia Mathematica can be understood as the technical working-out of his view that the purpose of philosophy is the clarification our conceptual scheme.
Many commentators now view Quine's ‘Truth by Convention’ as a flawed criticism of Carnap. Gary Ebbs argued recently that Quine never intended Carnap as his target. Quine's criticisms were part of his attempt to work out his own scientific naturalism. I agree that Carnap was not Quine's target but object that Quine's criticisms were wholly internal to his own philosophy. Instead, I argue that C.I. Lewis held the kind of truth‐by‐convention thesis that Quine rejects. This, however, leaves Carnap out of the picture. I then show how Quine came to see the earlier criticisms as also having force against Carnap.
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