Despite the importance placed on professional skepticism by the accounting profession and regulators, the failure of auditors to exercise an appropriate level of skepticism continues to be a global issue. We experimentally test a potential barrier to skepticism. We find that outcome knowledge biases supervisors' evaluations of skeptical behavior. Holding a staff member's skeptical judgments and acts constant, superiors on the engagement team evaluate the staff's skeptical behavior based on whether the staff's investigation of an issue ultimately identifies a misstatement. Our evidence suggests that evaluators penalize auditors who employ an appropriate level of skepticism, but do not identify a misstatement. Although consultation with their superiors while exercising skepticism improved staff auditors' performance evaluations, consultation did not effectively mitigate the outcome effect on their evaluations. Last, we observe that auditors in the field anticipate that their superiors will be influenced by outcome knowledge when they evaluate their skeptical behavior. Collectively, our results depict an evaluation system that may inadvertently discourage skepticism among auditors in the field. Data Availability: Contact the authors.
We study the interrelation between conservatism and earnings management by examining the allowance for uncollectible accounts and its income statement counterpart, bad debt expense. We find that the allowance is conservative and that it has become more conservative over time. Conservatism may, however, facilitate earnings management. We find that firms manage bad debt expense downward (and even record income‐increasing bad debt expense) to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts and that conservatism accentuates the extent to which firms manage bad debt expense. Further, we find that firms manage bad debt expense downward by drawing down previously recorded over‐accruals of bad debt expense that have accumulated on the balance sheet. An implication of our study is that tighter limits on the amount by which firms are permitted to understate net assets may reduce their ability to manage earnings.
This study draws upon research on escalation of commitment, motivated reasoning, and prior involvement to formulate hypotheses about the effects of prior auditor involvement and client pressure on the magnitude of proposed audit adjustments. Consistent with theory, our experimental results reveal that auditors who have no involvement in waiving a prior period audit adjustment propose current period audit adjustments that are significantly larger than auditors who have involvement in waiving a prior period audit adjustment. Further, we find that client pressure significantly reduces the magnitude of proposed audit adjustments, although the effect of client pressure does not vary across levels of prior involvement. This suggests that client pressure continues to exert a meaningful influence on auditor judgments in the post-SOX environment.
The proliferation of electronic workpapers at audit firms allows audit managers and partners the choice of interacting electronically with their audit teams, as opposed to communicating with them in person. Prior research indicates that in-person discussion during review positively impacts audit effectiveness, while electronic review may improve audit efficiency. Thus, the choice of review format can be viewed as both a crucial and controllable audit input that can affect audit quality and, in turn, the reliability of financial statements. Still, little is known about how this decision is made. We conduct a survey and an experiment to extend the audit literature by examining reviewers' choice of review format and by considering factors that influence this important choice. Survey evidence suggests that reviewers perceive in-person interaction during review as more effective and electronic interaction as more convenient. Given these findings, we conduct an experiment that explores whether misstatement risk and workload pressure influence the choice of review method. We find that these factors interact to affect reviewer behavior. Specifically, workload pressure can increase the likelihood of electronic review, but only when misstatement risk is low. When risk is high, reviewers choose to employ in-person reviews regardless of workload pressures. These findings are particularly relevant in light of changes in the regulatory environment that both emphasize the auditor's role in detecting fraud/errors and exacerbate traditional workload pressures during busy times of the year. Our results suggest that reviewers cope with these conflicting pressures by choosing alternative review formats.
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