The literature on insight lists four main characteristics of this experience: (a) suddenness (the experience is surprising and immediate), ease (the solution is processed without difficulty), positive affect (insights are gratifying), and the feeling of being right (after an insight, problem solvers judge the solution as being true and have confidence in this judgment). Although this phenomenology is well known, no theory has explained why insight feels the way it does. We propose a fluency account of insight: Positive affect and perceived truth and confidence in one’s own judgment are triggered by the sudden appearance of the solution for a problem and the concomitant surprising fluency gain in processing. We relate earlier evidence on insight concerning the impact of sudden fluency variations on positive affect and perceived truth and confidence.

People can intuitively detect whether a word triad has a common remote associate (coherent) or does not have one (incoherent) before and independently of actually retrieving the common associate. The authors argue that semantic coherence increases the processing fluency for coherent triads and that this increased fluency triggers a brief and subtle positive affect, which is the experiential basis of these intuitions. In a series of 11 experiments with 3 different fluency manipulations (figure-ground contrast, repeated exposure, and subliminal visual priming) and 3 different affect inductions (short-timed facial feedback, subliminal facial priming, and affect-laden word triads), high fluency and positive affect independently and additively increased the probability that triads would be judged as coherent, irrespective of actual coherence. The authors could equalize and even reverse coherence judgments (i.e., incoherent triads were judged to be coherent more frequently than were coherent triads). When explicitly instructed, participants were unable to correct their judgments for the influence of affect, although they were aware of the manipulation. The impact of fluency and affect was also generalized to intuitions of visual coherence and intuitions of grammaticality in an artificial grammar learning paradigm. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).

Can mouth movements shape attitudes? When people articulate different consonants (e.g., B or K) they press the tongue and the lips against various spots in the mouth. This allows for construction of words that feature systematic wanderings of consonantal stricture spots either from the front to the rear (inward; e.g., BENOKA) or from the rear to the front (outward; e.g., KENOBA) of the mouth. These wanderings of muscular strictures resemble the oral kinematics during either deglution (swallowing-like, inward movement) or expectoration (spitting-like, outward movement). Thus, we predicted that the articulation of inward and outward words induces motivational states associated with deglutition and expectoration--namely, approach and avoidance--which was tested in 9 experiments (total N = 822). Inward words were preferred over outward words, being labeled as nonsense words (Experiments 1, 4, 5, 6, and 9), company names (Experiment 2), or person names (Experiments 3, 7, and 8), with control words falling in between (Experiment 5). As a social-behavioral consequence, ostensible chat partners were more often chosen to interact with when having inward compared to outward names (Experiment 7). The effect was found in German-speaking (Experiments 1-5) and English-speaking (Experiment 6) samples, and it occurred even under silent reading (all experiments) and for negatively labeled targets (names of villains; Experiment 8). Showing articulation simulations as being the causal undercurrent, this effect was absent in aphasia patients who lacked covert subvocalizations (Experiment 9).

The authors apply an embodied account to mere exposure, arguing that through the repeated exposure of a particular stimulus, motor responses specifically associated to that stimulus are repeatedly simulated, thus trained, and become increasingly fluent. This increased fluency drives preferences for repeated stimuli. This hypothesis was tested by blocking stimulus-specific motor simulations during repeated exposure. In Experiment 1, chewing gum while evaluating stimuli destroyed mere exposure effects (MEEs) for words but not for visual characters. However, concurrently kneading a ball left both MEEs unaffected. In Experiment 2, concurrently whispering an unrelated word destroyed MEEs for words but not for characters, even when implemented either exclusively during the initial presentation or during the test phase and when the first presentation involved an evaluation or a mere study of the stimuli. In Experiment 3, a double dissociation between 2 classes of stimuli was demonstrated, namely, words (oral) and tunes (vocal). A concurrent oral task (tongue movements) destroyed MEEs for words but not for tone sequences. A concurrent vocal task (humming "mm-hm") destroyed MEEs for tone sequences but not for words.

No abstract