This article is about the socio‐legal construction of one of the least‐loved birds in the United Kingdom: the ‘seagull'. In particular, it is about how the gull has been brought within the realm of the ‘anti‐social', in a context in which urban‐nesting gulls (of which there are many in the United Kingdom) are cast as causing a great deal of public nuisance, ranging from noise, aggression, and mess, to attacks, injuries, and stress. The article examines the measures adopted by local authorities to regulate the gull population – and to regulate people, in the name of regulating gulls – and shows how a construction of the ‘seagull’ underpins and justifies this regulatory framework. It argues that the story of the regulation of seagulls in the United Kingdom is also a story about the construction of public space, to the point that the measures adopted here challenge the very idea of public space.
This article focuses on the concept of the support bubble. The concept was introduced in New Zealand in March 2020 in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic to denote a network of people with whom a person could have physical contact, and was later taken up in various forms elsewhere, particularly in the UK. The article focuses on the meaning that was attached to the concept and to the ways of being together that it encapsulated and stipulated. Where support bubbles were formalised as a matter of law, as in New Zealand and the UK, a particular form of relating was legally constructed and real relationships were affected through law. The article addresses the meaning and implications of the concept of the support bubble in this light. First, it considers the concept of the support bubble as a new legal form, which drew in, and built on, a range of relationships and then recast them in terms of a new legal form. Second, it analyses the central question posed by the concept as one of the meaning of being together in a support bubble, not only for those navigating and living with the concept in practice, but also as mediated in and through law. Third, it outlines how the concept of the support bubble represented a distinct legal development. It enabled those who were eligible to define for themselves, albeit within a specified framework, the meaning and nature of a relationship of support of this kind. It also supplied a space in which some kinds of relationships that had not necessarily attracted much previous legal attention—like friendships and dating relationships—came to find a degree of legal reflection and recognition.
This article examines the category of ‘the child’ in European human rights law, based on an analysis of the child‐related jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. It argues that a full account of legal selfhood is constructed through the notion of ‘the child’ in this jurisprudence. The two notions – of ‘the child’ and ‘the self’ – are, from the outset, mutually dependent. The conceptualisation of ‘the child’ in human rights law is underpinned by an account of the self as originating in another and childhood is cast as enabling self‐understanding by making possible the formation of a narrative about the self. The vision of ‘the self’ that emerges is one of ‘the narrative self’, and I assess the implications of this both for the idea of childhood in which this narrative originates and for the vision of the human condition that is expressed in European human rights law more broadly.
In recent years, the principle of 'living together' has emerged in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights as a possible justification for limitations on the rights to freedom of religion and to respect for private life. This note assesses the meaning of this principle, and, in particular, the critical development in its conceptualisation marked by the recent judgment of Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v Switzerland (2017). Although the notion of 'living together' is not explicitly mentioned in this case, I suggest that its ethos underlies the judgment entirely, and that what can ultimately be drawn from the reasoning of the Court in this case is a vision of 'living together' as consisting in 'living in exactly the same way'.
This article argues that the relationship of EU fundamental rights to the rest of EU law can only be understood if the former are seen as an integral part of a general vision of what EU law is about. This vision conceives EU law as concerned to secure the government of a European political economy. In turn, it has come to shape the interpretation and incidence of EU fundamental rights with the latter conceived as a central tool for incorporating the individual into and asserting her place within the government of the European political economy. A paradox has therefore emerged. EU fundamental rights have become ever more pervasive in EU law, and it is couched more frequently in their terms, but these same fundamental rights seem ineffectual to deal with the suffering caused by events such as the crisis.
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