The authors examine the role and nature of the market for voluntary health insurance in the European Union and review the impact of public policy, at both the national and E.U. levels, on the development of this market in recent years. The conceptual framework, based on a model of industrial analysis, allows a wide range of policy questions regarding market structure, conduct, and performance. By analyzing these three aspects of the market for voluntary health insurance, the authors are also able to raise questions about the equity and efficiency of voluntary health insurance as a means of funding health care in the European Union. The analysis suggests that the market for voluntary health insurance in the European Union suffers from significant information failures that seriously limit its potential for competition or efficiency and also reduce equity. Substantial deregulation of the E.U. market for voluntary health insurance has stripped regulatory bodies of their power to protect consumers and poses interesting challenges for national regulators, particularly if the market is to expand in the future. In a deregulated environment, it is questionable whether this method of funding health care will encourage a more efficient and equitable allocation of resources.
This article considers the potential for insurer competition to improve health system performance by strengthening purchasing. Economic theory suggests that insurer competition will enhance efficiency if: (1) people have free choice of insurer, (2) competition is based on price and quality rather than risk selection and (3) insurers have tools to influence health care costs and quality. The article assesses the extent to which these assumptions hold in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. It finds that health insurance market reforms in these countries have had mixed results in fulfilling these assumptions. In spite of significant investment in risk equalisation, incentives for risk selection remain. Consumer mobility is lower among older and chronically ill people, possibly due to close interaction between statutory and voluntary coverage. Although insurers in some countries increasingly have tools to enhance value, they may not always use them. The analysis suggests that the instrumental value of insurer competition rests on multiple assumptions that can only be upheld through frequently complex interventions often requiring elusive data. Making it work therefore requires action on several fronts, particularly to ensure incentives are aligned across the health system, and awareness of the political nature of some barriers to success.
Several European countries have considered introducing choice of public or private health insurance - usually by allowing people to ‘opt out’ of the statutory scheme - under the assumption that enhancing consumer choice and stimulating competition between insurers will be beneficial. This article examines the impact of opting out on equity and efficiency in European health systems. Focusing on Germany and the Netherlands - the only European countries where this type of choice has been available to significant population groups for a prolonged period (from 1970 to the present day in Germany, and from 1941 to 1986 in the Netherlands) - the analysis suggests that current policy debates may overstate the potential benefits of opting out. Due to market failures in health insurance and differences in the regulatory frameworks governing public and private insurers, choice of public or private coverage creates strong incentives for private insurers to select risks and leads to risk segmentation, thereby breaching equity in funding health care, heightening the financial risk borne by public insurers and lowering incentives for private insurers to operate efficiently. Measures can be taken to correct these negative effects, but some forms of regulation may be politically and technically difficult to implement.
Objectives Currently, there are no published randomised, controlled veterinary trials evaluating the efficacy of antiepileptic medication in the treatment of myoclonic seizures. Myoclonic seizures are a hallmark of feline audiogenic seizures (FARS). Methods This prospective, randomised, open-label trial compared the efficacy and tolerability of levetiracetam (20-25 mg/kg q8h) with phenobarbital (3-5 mg/kg q12h) in cats with suspected FARS that experienced myoclonic seizures. Cats were included that had ⩾12 myoclonic seizure days during a prospective 12 week baseline period. This was followed by a 4 week titration phase (until a therapeutic serum concentration of phenobarbital was achieved) and a 12 week treatment phase. Results Fifty-seven cats completed the study: 28 in the levetiracetam group and 29 in the phenobarbital group. A reduction of ⩾50% in the number of myoclonic seizure days was seen in 100% of patients in the levetiracetam group and in 3% of patients in the phenobarbital group ( P <0.001) during the treatment period. Levetiracetam-treated cats had higher freedom from myoclonic seizures (50.0% vs 0%; P <0.001) during the treatment period. The most common adverse events were lethargy, inappetence and ataxia, with no difference in incidence between levetiracetam and phenobarbital. Adverse events were mild and transient with levetiracetam but persistent with phenobarbital. Conclusions and relevance These results suggest that levetiracetam is an effective and well tolerated treatment for cats with myoclonic seizures and is more effective than phenobarbital. Whether it will prevent the occurrence of generalised tonic-clonic seizures and other forebrain signs if used early in the course of FARS is not yet clear.
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