Using data from the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG), we show that women who report that religion is "very important" in their everyday life have both higher fertility and higher intended fertility than those saying religion is "somewhat important" or "not important." Factors such as unwanted fertility, age at childbearing, or degree of fertility postponement seem not to contribute to religiosity differentials in fertility. This answer prompts more fundamental questions: what is the nature of this greater "religiosity"? And why do the more religious want more children? We show that those saying religion is more important have more traditional gender and family attitudes and that these attitudinal differences account for a substantial part of the fertility differential. We speculate regarding other contributing causes.

In low-fertility contexts, how many children people have is largely a product of how many children they want. However, the social, institutional, and individual factors that influence how many children people want are not well understood. In particular, there is scant evidence about how fertility expectations change over the life course. This article provides an empirical description of changes in women's expected fertility over the entire span of childbearing years. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 cohort, group-based trajectory analysis illuminates common patterns in the evolution of fertility intentions and identifies individual characteristics associated with these patterns. Factors related to family formation, such as marriage and whether a woman has a child at an early age, are found to be the most consistent correlates of patterns of change in expected family size.

Between 1970 and 1990, China experiencoed a rapid and sharp fertility decline-from total fertility rates of approximately six births to two. The degree to which Chinese fertility has continued to fall after 1990 is controversial. We use survey data from the 1997 National Population and Reproductive Health Survey and from the 2001 Reproductive Health and Family Planning Survey to document recent trends in Chinese fertility. Our estimates provide further evidence that China's fertility is well below-replacement level at the turn of the twenty-first century-with TFR levels of approximately 1.5 children per woman. Trends in parity-specific cohort fertility by age also suggest below replacement completed fertility for cohorts still in the childbearing years. In the article's second section, we identify key components of low period fertility in order to frame our discussion of two questions: 1) in what ways is Chinese low fertility different from/similar to that in other low-fertility countries? And 2) what are the likely future trends in Chinese fertility? Copyright (c) 2009 The Population Council, Inc..

In this article, I analyze women's decisions to have their daughters circumcised based on data from 7,873 women in Kenya collected in the 1998 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey. I use multilevel models to assess the degree to which women s decisions are correlated with the decisions of other women in their community, in addition to studying the effects of socioeconomic characteristics measured at both the individual and community levels. I find some support for modernization theories, which argue that economic development leads to gradual erosion of the practice of female circumcision. However, more community-level variation is explained by the convention hypothesis, which proposes that the prevalence of female circumcision will decline rapidly once parents see that a critical mass of other parents have stopped circumcising their daughters. I also find substantial variation among different ethnic groups in the pace and onset of the decline of female genital cutting.

Ambivalence towards future pregnancy is common and may increase the risk of unprotected sex and unintended pregnancy. We propose that ambivalent attitudes toward pregnancy consist of subtypes that are differentially associated with contraceptive use. Using data from a nationally representative survey of unmarried young adults (N = 1,147), we constructed four categories of ambivalence based on attitudes toward a hypothetical pregnancy. Multivariate analyses examined characteristics of ambivalence and the association between ambivalence and contraceptive use. Approximately one third of sexually active unmarried young adults are ambivalent about pregnancy. Having positive ambivalence (important to avoid a pregnancy but would be happy if it occurred) is associated with age, gender, education, and Hispanic origin. Although ambivalence toward pregnancy is associated with lower contraceptive use, this is true only among women with negative ambivalence (not important to avoid a pregnancy but would be unhappy if a pregnancy occurred). Attitudes toward pregnancy are multifaceted, and a more nuanced understanding of women's attitudes toward pregnancy can help target prevention programs and related policies for women at risk of unintended pregnancy.

The relationship between religious obligations and female genital cutting is explored using data from Burkina Faso, a religiously and ethnically diverse country where approximately three-quarters of adult women are circumcised. Data from the 2003 Burkina Faso Demographic and Health Survey are used to estimate multilevel models of religious variation in the intergenerational transmission of female genital cutting. Differences between Christians, Muslims, and adherents of traditional religions are reported along with an assessment of the extent to which individual and community characteristics account for religious differences. Religious variation in the intergenerational transmission of female genital cutting is largely explained by specific religious beliefs and by contextual rather than individual characteristics. Although Muslim women are more likely to have their daughter circumcised, the findings suggest the importance of a collective rather than individual Muslim identity for the continuation of the practice.

Childlessness in the United States nearly doubled between 1980 and 2000. Other dramatic changes in the U.S. population also took place over this period-notably, women's average educational attainment increased, and the proportion marrying declined-but the impact of these changes on childlessness has not been formally examined. In this article, I use data from the Current Population Survey Fertility Supplements (1995, 1998, 2004, 2008) and logistic regression and regression-based decomposition techniques to assess the contribution of changes in educational attainment, marriage behavior, and racial/ethnic composition on population levels of childlessness in the United States. Results show that increases in the proportion of women unmarried by age 40 contributed most to the increase in childlessness in the late twentieth century, although these increases were offset somewhat by increased childbearing among unmarried women. The rising proportion of women with a college degree also explained a substantial amount of the increase in childless women.

Maternal and Child Health (MCH) units, where VCT/PMTCT/HAART have been integrated with traditional services, play a critical role in the connection between the massive HAART rollout and reproductive behavior. In this article, we use data from semi-structured interviews with MCH workers and ethnographic observations carried out in southern Mozambique to explore this role from the institutional perspective. We find that, along with logistical and workload problems, the de facto segregation of PMTCT/HAART clients within the "integrated" MCH system and the simplistic and uncompromising message discouraging further fertility and stressing condom-based contraception, may pose serious challenges to a successful formulation and implementation of reproductive goals among seropositive clients. Although the recency of PMTCT/HAART services may partly explain these challenges, we argue that they are due largely to cultural miscommunication between providers and clients. We show how the cultural gap between the two is bridged by community activists and peer interactions among clients.