Research demonstrates that information sharing is facilitated by familiarity, and having a common understanding of problems, use of lexicon, and semantic meaning. These factors can be difficult to develop within extreme environments such as disasters as members of the multi‐agency system that responds often have limited experience of working together. Public inquiries repeatedly highlight the impact of information sharing difficulties on public safety, but limited academic research has focused on identifying concrete behaviours that facilitate interteam information sharing within such environments. This paper presents a case study of a national disaster response exercise involving 1,000 emergency responders. Data consist of structured observations, recordings of interteam meetings, and interviews with emergency responders. Results of mixed‐method analysis indicate that interteam information sharing is delayed by limited situation awareness and poor articulation. Conversely, adopting behaviours that promote common frames for understanding interteam capabilities and information requirements improves information sharing and potentially reduces cognitive effort required to process information. Findings contribute to interteam communication theory by highlighting that in complex, time‐constrained environments, having a shared understanding of responsibilities and information requirement is important for minimizing redundant deliberation and improving relevance and speed.Practitioner points Facilitating the exchange and interpretation of relevant information is important for improving situation assessment, decision‐making, and the implementation of appropriate actions for addressing risks.Interteam information sharing can be particularly challenging when teams are comprised of members from across different organizations with different language and cultures that must form ad hoc to rapidly respond to problems in extreme environments.Adopting communication strategies that develop common frames‐of‐reference can facilitate information sharing and interteam responses to disasters.

The impact of rapport-based interview techniques on suspect use of counter-interrogation tactics (CITs) was examined in an operational field sample of 181 police interrogations with international (Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda-inspired), paramilitary, and right-wing terrorists. The observing rapport-based interpersonal techniques (ORBIT) framework was used to code rapport-based interrogator skills along 2 dimensions: motivational interviewing skills and interpersonal competence (use of adaptive interviewing behaviors and absence of maladaptive interviewing behaviors). Two components of suspect behavior were measured using the ORBIT tool: interpersonal behavior and counter-interrogation techniques (passive, verbal, passive verbal, no-comment, and retraction). Structural equation modeling revealed that adaptive interviewing was directly associated with decreases in passive CITs but, counter to expectations, increased the prevalence of passive verbal responding. Interrogator use of motivational-interviewing-consistent skills was directly associated with improved adaptive interviewing; reduced maladaptive interviewing; and decreases in passive, verbal, and no-comment CITs, but was associated with higher rates of retraction. Motivational interviewing skills also had a significant indirect effect on reducing passive and increasing passive verbal CITs through its indirect effect on adaptive interviewing. Overall, findings indicate that adopting an adaptive rapport-based interrogation style in which suspects are treated with respect, dignity, and integrity is an effective approach for reducing suspects’ use of CITs.

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Multiteam systems (MTSs) are comprised of two or more interconnected teams working toward shared superordinate goals but with unique sub-goals. To date, research has predominantly focused on how decisions are made and has viewed these cognitive processes as occurring within individuals. However, for MTSs operating in extreme environments such as disasters, it is often not a question of how decisions are made, but what is causing delays and failures to make decisions. To understand the causes of decision delay within these complex networks, it is important to focus on decision processes at the multiteam level. Using naturalistic observational and interview data collected during a multi-site, multiteam emergency response to a large-scale disaster exercise, this study examines both information sharing (what was shared, with whom, how long this took), and decision processes across teams (situational awareness-SA, plan formulation, and plan execution). Findings demonstrate that interdependencies in cognitive processes exist across individuals where goals overlap. Decision delay is not only caused by failure to develop SA within a team preventing their ability to formulate and execute plans but also by the inability of other teams to execute their plans. The implications of these findings for developing targeted interventions are discussed.

Extreme environments such as disasters are often managed by several teams working towards a shared goal but with unique sub-goals at individual and team levels. Whilst these multiteam systems provide potential access to a wide pool of knowledge and resources, public inquiries repeatedly highlight coordination difficulties, leading to conflicting decisions and actions. However, limited research has focused on examining the interteam processes used to coordinate decisions in situ within extreme environments in order to cross-validate theory. Accordingly, the following study analyses naturalistic observations conducted during two large-scale live disaster response exercises in order to examine (1) what inter-team processes are used to coordinate decisions, and (2) the extent to which they correspond with a linear phase-based 'Joint Decision Model' (JDM) introduced to national UK disaster response guidance. Findings show responders frequently either revert to gathering information rather than progressing to take action, or take action without deliberately considering options, powers, and policies to form a plan. These non-linear decision processes remain largely similar across both exercises, indicating that the initial implementation of national JDM guidance has not yet led to substantial changes. Further focus is needed to identify mechanisms for improving coordination in practice, including the form and frequency of training required to maintain such complex skills.