The increasing havoc wrecked by catastrophic incidents on organisations worldwide, as well as the increasing devastating effects of these incidents, has necessitated the development of a framework to improve the reliability of organisations. Despite operating in tightly coupled and complex technologies, high reliability organisations (HROs) continue to operate mindfully with minimal incidents. Given that most disasters have occurred in organisations and industries not considered as truly HROs, this paper argues that applying organisational learning from HROs across diverse organisations in different industries could potentially reduce organisational disasters. This paper recognised the numerous researches in HRO theory, but noticed the unavailability of a harmonized measurable framework that could be standardized and applied across diverse organisations. Using the HRO principles, this paper conducted a research in 8 organisations, in 3 industries across 2 continents. It developed the organisational reliability maturity model (ORM 2 ) to track the progression organisations through 5 maturity levels. It developed the framework for organisational reliability maturity (FORM) to measure maturity levels of organisations, predict potentials for disasters, benchmark, and improvement organisations. It is hoped that this paper will deepen existing research in disaster prevention and HRO theory, while opening up new areas of knowledge.
T he purpose of this paper is to investigate the learning from rare events and the knowledge management process involved, which presents a significant challenge to many organizations. This is primarily attributed to the inability to interpret these events in a systematic and "rich" manner, which this paper seeks to address. We start by summarizing the relevant literature on humanitarian operations management (HOM), outlining the evolution of the socio-technical disaster lifecycle and its relationship with humanitarian operations, using a supply chain resilience theoretical lens. We then outline theories of organizational learning (and unlearning) from disasters and the impact on humanitarian operations. Subsequently, we theorize the role of middle managers in humanitarian operations, which is the main focus of our paper. The main methodology incorporates a hybrid of two techniques for root cause analysis, applied to two related case studies. The cases were specifically selected as, despite occurring twenty years apart, there are many similarities in the chain of causation and supporting factors, potentially suggesting that adequate learning from experience and failures is not occurring. This provides a novel learning experience within the HOM paradigm. Hence, the proposed approach is based on a multilevel structure that facilitates the operationalization of learning from rare events in humanitarian operations. The results show that we are able to provide an environment for multiple interpretations and effective learning, with emphasis on middle managers within a humanitarian operations and crisis/disaster management context.
Why do organisations need to learn from prior failures in this uncertain and complex environment? How can they learn from prior failures? This paper aims to answer the above questions using the relevant literature and by analysing two cases from the aviation industry.To achieve this, Fault Tree Analyses and Reliability Block Diagram will be applied to ValuJet Flight 592 and Swissair Flight SR111 crashes to identify their root causes and discuss the lessons learned or not learned. Thus, learning from failures using advanced techniques do not only indicates the root causes of the disaster but increase the knowledge of the organisation as they can identify the gaps in their system and learn from them.
We describe two well-established, practice-based Master’s programmes as examples of existing competence development opportunities for practitioners and how such links between theory and practice can be developed and taught within the Higher Education (HE) context. We hypothesise that learning from major failures is essential in linking theory with practice in both engineering and management education. We investigate how to train emergency response teams on coping with, and learning from, rare events; a major challenge to other practitioners in the fields of safety and risk management. Comparison is undertaken between two disasters—Hurricane Katrina in the USA and the relatively recent Grenfell Tower in the UK—using a balanced dual approach of paradoxes, a dichotomy. In this paper, we demonstrate the enhancement of both engineering and management education. This was achieved through using the two case studies to emphasize the relevance of incorporating advanced mental modelling approaches for root cause analysis in training and by comparing the two cases with respect to the black swan and black elephant concepts. It is recommended that future training has a balanced approach that encompasses the outlined features of dichotomies.
The aim of this paper is to explore whether and how far organisations learn from failures. Methods: The paper reviews the current literature about organisational learning and theories of learning from failures, where learning here implies change of practice, and use of modelling techniques to inform recommendations to prevent repetition of similar incidents. Further, it analyses two case studies related to aspects of security and safety: the Virginia Tech Shooting in 2007 and the Lion Air 610 crash in 2018. Both case studies address the concept of learning from failures. In doing so, an analysis of the root causes and vulnerabilities through the methods of Fault Tree Analysis and Reliability Block Diagram is conducted to identify lessons to be learned. Results: Findings are intended to stimulate organisational learning and improve organisational processes to mitigate disasters from happening again. Conclusion: The value of this study is that aspects of learning and unlearning from failures have been identified for the cases used. Expectation for future studies is to extend the proposed methodology to other cases in the fields of surveillance, security and safety.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.