P. Kyle Stanford defends the problem of unconceived alternatives, which maintains that scientists are unlikely to conceive of all the scientifically plausible alternatives to the theories they accept. Stanford's argument has been criticized on the grounds that the failure of individual scientists to conceive of relevant alternatives does not entail the failure of science as a corporate body to do so. I consider two replies to this criticism and find both lacking. In the process, I argue that Stanford does not provide evidence that there are likely scientifically plausible unconceived alternatives to scientific theories accepted now and in the future.
Religious pluralism is the view that more than one religion is correct, and that no religion enjoys a special status in relation to the ultimate. Yet the world religions appear to be incompatible. How, then, can more than one be correct? Discussions and critiques of religious pluralism usually focus on the work of John Hick, yet there are a number of other pluralists whose responses to this incompatibility problem are importantly different from Hick's. This article surveys the solutions of Hick, Harrison, Heim, Byrne, and Knitter to the incompatibility problem. I conclude that, while none of these views is without weakness, there are several promising pluralist solutions to this problem. Moreover, confessionalists (i.e. exclusivists and inclusivists) must also address issues related to incompatibility.Religious pluralism 1 is the view that more than one religion is correct, and that no religion enjoys a special status in relation to the ultimate. Religious pluralists (henceforth 'pluralists' unless context demands greater precision) appear to have two central motivations. First, pluralists find value and connectedness with the transcendent in the religious experiences and moral teachings of many established religions. Second, pluralists want to preserve the integrity and dignity of established religions, especially in the context of a history of religious violence, oppression, and colonialism. The various attempts to develop pluralism have been intensely contested both by those who think that they are misguided in intent and by those who think that they fail to be sufficiently pluralistic. In this article, I outline various pluralist responses 2 to one of the main objections to pluralism: the incompatibility problem.The incompatibility problem lies in the fact that the world religions appear to be incompatible, yet religious pluralists assert that more than one of them is correct. Discussions and critiques of religious pluralism usually focus on the work of John Hick, but there are a number of other pluralists whose responses to the incompatibility problem are importantly different from Hick's. Accordingly, this article surveys the solutions of Hick, Harrison, Heim, Byrne, and Knitter. I conclude that, while none of these views is without weakness, there are several promising pluralist solutions to the incompatibility problem. Moreover, those opposing pluralism have an incompatibility problem of their own.
In "Can Models of God Compete?", J. R. Hustwit engages with fundamental questions regarding the epistemological foundations of modeling God. He argues that the approach of fallibilism best captures the criteria he employs to choose among different "models of God-modeling," including one criterion that I call the Descriptive Criterion. I argue that Hustwit's case for fallibilism should include both a stronger defense for the Descriptive Criterion and an explanation of the reasons that fallibilism does not run awry of this criterion in virtue of its apparent inability to make sense of debates among models of God extant in religious communities. This paper was delivered during the APA Pacific 2007 MiniConference on Models of God.Keywords Models of God . Religious epistemology J. R. Hustwit's excellent paper, "Can Models of God Compete? Testing the Strength of Religion's Language-Reality Ties," is directed towards a number of essential questions concerning the intentions and capabilities of theistic discourse (Hustwit 2007). I think the issues he raises are crucial both to the aims of this conference and to theological inquiry in general. In this response, I raise two questions about his methodology of evaluating ways of thinking about our talk about God.Hustwit operates on the assumption of the co-constitution thesis, which holds that humans' experience of the world is a product of both the world and our sensory, cognitive, and cultural natures. He is interested in discovering the best "Model of God-Modeling," or MGM, among four choices: mysteriosophy, theopoetics, critical realism, and fallibilism. Hustwit concludes that we should approach God-modeling from the standpoint of fallibilism, the view that our God-modeling is referential in intent and ability, but that we are in dire epistemic straits due to our limited understanding even of the proper criteria for model choice.
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