A cognitive map has long been the dominant metaphor for hippocampal function, embracing the idea that place cells encode a geometric representation of space. However, evidence for predictive coding, reward sensitivity and policy dependence in place cells suggests that the representation is not purely spatial. We approach this puzzle from a reinforcement learning perspective: what kind of spatial representation is most useful for maximizing future reward? We show that the answer takes the form of a predictive representation. This representation captures many aspects of place cell responses that fall outside the traditional view of a cognitive map. Furthermore, we argue that entorhinal grid cells encode a low-dimensionality basis set for the predictive representation, useful for suppressing noise in predictions and extracting multiscale structure for hierarchical planning.

A cognitive map has long been the dominant metaphor for hippocampal function, embracing the idea that place cells encode a geometric representation of space. However, evidence for predictive coding, reward sensitivity, and policy dependence in place cells suggests that the representation is not purely spatial. We approach this puzzle from a reinforcement learning perspective: what kind of spatial representation is most useful for maximizing future reward? We show that the answer takes the form of a predictive representation. This representation captures many aspects of place cell responses that fall outside the traditional view of a cognitive map. Furthermore, we argue that entorhinal grid cells encode a low-dimensional basis set for the predictive representation, useful for suppressing noise in predictions and extracting multiscale structure for hierarchical planning.

Theories of reward learning in neuroscience have focused on two families of algorithms, thought to capture deliberative vs. habitual choice. "Model-based" algorithms compute the value of candidate actions from scratch, whereas "model-free" algorithms make choice more efficient but less flexible by storing pre-computed action values. We examine an intermediate algorithmic family, the successor representation (SR), which balances flexibility and efficiency by storing partially computed action values: predictions about future events. These pre-computation strategies differ in how they update their choices following changes in a task. SR's reliance on stored predictions about future states predicts a unique signature of insensitivity to changes in the task's sequence of events, but flexible adjustment following changes to rewards. We provide evidence for such differential sensitivity in two behavioral studies with humans. These results suggest that the SR is a computational substrate for semi-flexible choice in humans, introducing a subtler, more cognitive notion of habit.

Humans and animals are capable of evaluating actions by considering their long-run future rewards through a process described using model-based reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms. The mechanisms by which neural circuits perform the computations prescribed by model-based RL remain largely unknown; however, multiple lines of evidence suggest that neural circuits supporting model-based behavior are structurally homologous to and overlapping with those thought to carry out model-free temporal difference (TD) learning. Here, we lay out a family of approaches by which model-based computation may be built upon a core of TD learning. The foundation of this framework is the successor representation, a predictive state representation that, when combined with TD learning of value predictions, can produce a subset of the behaviors associated with model-based learning, while requiring less decision-time computation than dynamic programming. Using simulations, we delineate the precise behavioral capabilities enabled by evaluating actions using this approach, and compare them to those demonstrated by biological organisms. We then introduce two new algorithms that build upon the successor representation while progressively mitigating its limitations. Because this framework can account for the full range of observed putatively model-based behaviors while still utilizing a core TD framework, we suggest that it represents a neurally plausible family of mechanisms for model-based evaluation.

Prior work decoding linguistic meaning from imaging data has been largely limited to concrete nouns, using similar stimuli for training and testing, from a relatively small number of semantic categories. Here we present a new approach for building a brain decoding system in which words and sentences are represented as vectors in a semantic space constructed from massive text corpora. By efficiently sampling this space to select training stimuli shown to subjects, we maximize the ability to generalize to new meanings from limited imaging data. To validate this approach, we train the system on imaging data of individual concepts, and show it can decode semantic vector representations from imaging data of sentences about a wide variety of both concrete and abstract topics from two separate datasets. These decoded representations are sufficiently detailed to distinguish even semantically similar sentences, and to capture the similarity structure of meaning relationships between sentences.

Midbrain dopamine neurons signal reward prediction error (RPE), or actual minus expected reward. The temporal difference (TD) learning model has been a cornerstone in understanding how dopamine RPEs could drive associative learning. Classically, TD learning imparts value to features that serially track elapsed time relative to observable stimuli. In the real world, however, sensory stimuli provide ambiguous information about the hidden state of the environment, leading to the proposal that TD learning might instead compute a value signal based on an inferred distribution of hidden states (a ‘belief state’). In this work, we asked whether dopaminergic signaling supports a TD learning framework that operates over hidden states. We found that dopamine signaling exhibited a striking difference between two tasks that differed only with respect to whether reward was delivered deterministically. Our results favor an associative learning rule that combines cached values with hidden state inference.

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Midbrain dopamine neurons are commonly thought to report a reward prediction error (RPE), as hypothesized by reinforcement learning (RL) theory. While this theory has been highly successful, several lines of evidence suggest that dopamine activity also encodes sensory prediction errors unrelated to reward. Here, we develop a new theory of dopamine function that embraces a broader conceptualization of prediction errors. By signalling errors in both sensory and reward predictions, dopamine supports a form of RL that lies between model-based and model-free algorithms. This account remains consistent with current canon regarding the correspondence between dopamine transients and RPEs, while also accounting for new data suggesting a role for these signals in phenomena such as sensory preconditioning and identity unblocking, which ostensibly draw upon knowledge beyond reward predictions.