We review the leaky competing accumulator model for two-alternative forced-choice decisions with cued responses, and propose extensions to account for the influence of unequal rewards. Assuming that stimulus information is integrated until the cue to respond arrives and that firing rates of stimulus-selective neurons remain well within physiological bounds, the model reduces to an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process that yields explicit expressions for the psychometric function that describes accuracy. From these we compute strategies that optimize the rewards expected over blocks of trials administered with mixed difficulty and reward contingencies. The psychometric function is characterized by two parameters: its midpoint slope, which quantifies a subject's ability to extract signal from noise, and its shift, which measures the bias applied to account for unequal rewards. We fit these to data from two monkeys performing the moving dots task with mixed coherences and reward schedules. We find that their behaviors averaged over multiple sessions are close to optimal, with shifts erring in the direction of smaller penalties. We propose two methods for biasing the OU process to produce such shifts.

Why is it that behaviors that rely on control, so striking in their diversity and flexibility, are also subject to such striking limitations? Typically, people cannot engage in more than a few — and usually only a single — control-demanding task at a time. This limitation was a defining element in the earliest conceptualizations of controlled processing, it remains one of the most widely accepted axioms of cognitive psychology, and is even the basis for some laws (e.g., against the use of mobile devices while driving). Remarkably, however, the source of this limitation is still not understood. Here, we examine one potential source of this limitation, in terms of a tradeoff between the flexibility and efficiency of representation (“multiplexing”) and the simultaneous engagement of different processing pathways (“multitasking”). We show that even a modest amount of multiplexing rapidly introduces cross-talk among processing pathways, thereby constraining the number that can be productively engaged at once. We propose that, given the large number of advantages of efficient coding, the human brain has favored this over the capacity for multitasking of control-demanding processes.

The interplay between the compositional changes in the gastrointestinal microbiome, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) susceptibility and severity, and host functions is complex and yet to be fully understood. This study performed 16S rRNA gene-based microbial profiling of 143 subjects. We observed structural and compositional alterations in the gut microbiota of the SARS-CoV-2-infected group in comparison to non-infected controls. The gut microbiota composition of the SARS-CoV-2-infected individuals showed an increase in anti-inflammatory bacteria such as Faecalibacterium (p-value = 1.72 × 10–6) and Bacteroides (p-value = 5.67 × 10–8). We also revealed a higher relative abundance of the highly beneficial butyrate producers such as Anaerostipes (p-value = 1.75 × 10–230), Lachnospiraceae (p-value = 7.14 × 10–65), and Blautia (p-value = 9.22 × 10–18) in the SARS-CoV-2-infected group in comparison to the control group. Moreover, phylogenetic investigation of communities by reconstructing unobserved state (PICRUSt) functional prediction analysis of the 16S rRNA gene abundance data showed substantial differences in the enrichment of metabolic pathways such as lipid, amino acid, carbohydrate, and xenobiotic metabolism, in comparison between both groups. We discovered an enrichment of linoleic acid, ether lipid, glycerolipid, and glycerophospholipid metabolism in the SARS-CoV-2-infected group, suggesting a link to SARS-CoV-2 entry and replication in host cells. We estimate the major contributing genera to the four pathways to be Parabacteroides, Streptococcus, Dorea, and Blautia, respectively. The identified differences provide a new insight to enrich our understanding of SARS-CoV-2-related changes in gut microbiota, their metabolic capabilities, and potential screening biomarkers linked to COVID-19 disease severity.

Research in psychology and neuroscience has successfully modeled decision making as a process of noisy evidence accumulation to a decision bound. While there are several variants and implementations of this idea, the majority of these models make use of a noisy accumulation between two absorbing boundaries. A common assumption of these models is that decision parameters, e.g., the rate of accumulation (drift rate), remain fixed over the course of a decision, allowing the derivation of analytic formulas for the probabilities of hitting the upper or lower decision threshold, and the mean decision time. There is reason to believe, however, that many types of behavior would be better described by a model in which the parameters were allowed to vary over the course of the decision process. In this paper, we use martingale theory to derive formulas for the mean decision time, hitting probabilities, and first passage time (FPT) densities of a Wiener process with time-varying drift between two time-varying absorbing boundaries. This model was first studied by Ratcliff (1980) in the two-stage form, and here we consider the same model for an arbitrary number of stages (i.e. intervals of time during which parameters are constant). Our calculations enable direct computation of mean decision times and hitting probabilities for the associated multistage process. We also provide a review of how martingale theory may be used to analyze similar models employing Wiener processes by re-deriving some classical results. In concert with a variety of numerical tools already available, the current derivations should encourage mathematical analysis of more complex models of decision making with time-varying evidence.

How do we combine memories with sensory input to make decisions? Previous research has shown that perceptual decisions can be made on the basis of prior expectations combined with sensory input. To date, these expectations have been treated as static, received quantities, fixed across decisions of the same type. Here, we tested the hypothesis that expectations can themselves be inferred using dynamic evidence accumulation, in a process continuous with that of sensory inference. In two experiments using a novel cue-guided perceptual decision task that independently varied memory and sensory evidence, we tested the degree to which decisions reflected accumulation of both kinds of information. In Experiment 1, we found that participants' response times and choices matched the qualitative and quantitative predictions of a two-stage evidence accumulation model. In Experiment 2, participants performed the same task while being scanned using fMRI. Using neural pattern analysis, we measured the expectations that participants formed in advance of a noisy visual stimulus on each trial, and found that these trial-specific expectations reliably predicted the speed of subsequent responses. These results demonstrate that perceptual decisions rely on a continuous process of evidence accumulation, that begins by dynamically inferring possible responses even before sensory information is available.Good decisions should draw on all available useful information. Laboratory studies of decision-making tend to focus on choices made on the basis of a single kind of information -such as anticipated utility [1], sensory input [2], or mnemonic evidence [3, 4] -taken alone. But in the real world, our decisions depend on integrating across sources.For instance, when traveling on an unfamiliar train route, I might miss my intended stop. How do I figure out where to make the transfer to get back on my desired route? I could rely solely on sight -as the train stops at each station, quickly scan the platform for helpful signs or markings. I could rely solely on my memories -which station is next? Will it have 1 peer-reviewed)