Summary "Political will" is oft-cited as the major obstacle to government's anti-corruption efforts. Notwithstanding, there is remarkably little systematic analysis of the concept, with some scholars describing it as the "slipperiest concept in the policy lexicon," whereas others are calling for its empirical relevance. This paper tries to unpack the "black box" of political will by making it an empirically relevant concept drawing on evidence from two Asian countries; Singapore and Bangladesh. Four key indicators based on the works of earlier scholars are used including origin of the initiative; comprehension and extent of analysis; credible sanctions; and resource dedication and sustenance are used.

Fiscal decentralization has gained support by most of the world's leading development organizations including the World Bank, United States Agency for International Development and, Asian Development Bank among others in the last two to three decades. It is therefore of much importance that some form of thought is given to the operations of this system to make it more beneficial. Drawing selectively on large academic and practical literature on fiscal decentralization and the articles in this volume, this article outlines the state of fiscal decentralization in current times. It then goes on to outline some key arguments in favor of and against fiscal decentralization as a system of government. The theoretical framework of fiscal decentralization is also discussed in this article with regards to the stabilization, distribution and allocation functions. An overview of this system of government so far as Ghana is concerned has also been touched on with much emphasis on the legal framework and the key sources of finance for subnational governments. Finally, a number of factors for improving and making this system more beneficial and sustainable over time are identified.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to develop a conceptual framework for improving the interaction between horizontal and social accountability mechanisms for enhanced accountability outcomes. Design/methodology/approach – This is a conceptual paper drawing on six published anti-corruption cases in the Asian region and in theory to develop a framework for understanding and improving the interaction between horizontal and social accountability mechanisms. Findings – The paper proposes that to have more improved interactions between horizontal and social accountability mechanisms, any or all of the following eight conditions must be met. These include, independence and capacity of horizontal accountability agencies; legal backing for horizontal and social accountability interaction; vibrant and independent media; strong partnership of civil society with the media for information dissemination; organisation of civil society into groups; credibility of horizontal and social accountability mechanisms; capacity of civil society (including human and financial capacity); horizontal accountability mechanisms to support and motivate social mechanism to “blow the alarm”. Originality/value – The conceptual framework developed in this paper makes a significant contribution to the accountability literature. In terms of policy, this framework can serve as a tool for governments, especially in Asia, seeking good governance through enhanced accountability outcomes.

The paper evaluates the effectiveness of local revenue mobilization in the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly (KMA), Ghana. The indicators for the evaluation included the Revenue Performance Index (RPI), Financial Autonomy Index (FAI) and Local Finance Support Index (LFSI). Both the primary and secondary sources of data were used as well as the employment of quantitative and qualitative data analysis methods. The paper reveals that KMA depends more on transfers to finance its development. There is therefore the need for the assembly to outline pragmatic measures to increase its Internally Generated Fund (IGF).

Interactions between horizontal accountability agencies (e.g., anti‐corruption agencies [ACAs]) and social accountability actors (e.g., journalists, civil society activists, and complainants/whistleblowers) are recognized as important to horizontal agencies’ performance, but the reason(s) is not clear. This study therefore explores why horizontal accountability agencies need social accountability actors in performing their functions. The study analyses data from 30 key stakeholders in Australia, including ACAs staff members, social accountability actors, and other observers to report on the specific support roles social actors play to ACAs’ activities and operations. Through the conceptual lens of social accountability, evidence show that social actors play four key types of support roles to ACAs’ activities and operations: activate ACAs’ investigations; “amplify” ACAs’ operations; guard ACAs’ activities and operations; and defend ACAs’ independence and powers. These findings support the need for interactions and, also, affirm the potential for research into how these support roles can better be provided for effective anti‐corruption outcomes. The research is of value to public accountability agencies in Australia, and internationally.