This article explores why citizens favor protection despite the economic case for free trade. It argues that due to a lack of training and in an environment of stable prices, many individuals are not aware of the consumption benefits. Even when they are aware, citizens tend to discount these benefits due to media coverage of the employment costs and loss aversion. The article presents survey evidence from an American sample, showing that a belief in lost jobs is more strongly associated with trade preferences than a belief in lower prices. Given that the former pushes citizens toward less favorable trade attitudes, it also presents evidence from a priming experiment, testing if attitudes can be moved in a more favorable direction with positive information. Factual information about the consumer benefits has no effect, but information about the employment effects shifts attitudes positively. In the present environment, it thus appears more effective to prime pro-trade attitudes by appealing to jobs than to prices.
Globalization is facing widespread condemnation at a time when worldwide crises ranging from climate change to pandemic policy increasingly demand a coordinated response. Rising nationalist, populist, and anti-globalization movements in many of the world's richest nations are placing great pressure on the international system pioneered by Western democracies following World War II. This special issue showcases new research on the sources and types of backlash. It also considers the consequences of this backlash for democracy, for international institutions and foreign policy. We aim to broaden the debate on the causes and consequences of rising populism and nationalism and offer unique perspectives on how and why the current international order is struggling to address the many global challenges in need of large-scale cooperative solutions.
Sender costs of economic sanctions exacerbate the enforcement problem associated with multilateral coercive measures. When third-country sanctioners share strategic interests with the target state, they have commercial and diplomatic incentives to defect from multilateral sanctions arrangements. In addition to these well-documented sender costs, this article argues that migration pressure from the target state has become an important consideration for potential sanctioners. Economic sanctions often increase the economic distress on the target country, which in turn causes more people to migrate to countries where their co-ethnics reside. Countries hosting a large number of nationals from the target country face a disproportionately high level of migration pressure when sanctions increase emigration from the target country. Therefore, policymakers of these countries oppose economic sanctions on the target country as an attempt to preempt further migration. Analyzing the sanctions bills in the European Parliament from 2011 to 2015, we find empirical support for our prediction.
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