Multisensory integration has often been characterized as an automatic process. Recent findings suggest that multisensory integration can occur across various stages of stimulus processing that are linked to, and can be modulated by, attention. Stimulus-driven, bottom-up mechanisms induced by cross-modal interactions can automatically capture attention towards multisensory events, particularly when competition to focus elsewhere is relatively low. Conversely, top-down attention can facilitate the integration of multisensory inputs and lead to a spread of attention across sensory modalities. These findings point to a more intimate and multifaceted interplay between attention and multisensory integration than was previously thought. We review developments in our understanding of the interactions between attention and multisensory processing, and propose a framework that unifies previous, apparently discordant findings.

One of the most commonly cited examples of human multisensory integration occurs during exposure to natural speech, when the vocal and the visual aspects of the signal are integrated in a unitary percept. Audiovisual association of facial gestures and vocal sounds has been demonstrated in nonhuman primates and in prelinguistic children, arguing for a general basis for this capacity. One critical question, however, concerns the role of attention in such multisensory integration. Although both behavioral and neurophysiological studies have converged on a preattentive conceptualization of audiovisual speech integration, this mechanism has rarely been measured under conditions of high attentional load, when the observers' attention resources are depleted. We tested the extent to which audiovisual integration was modulated by the amount of available attentional resources by measuring the observers' susceptibility to the classic McGurk illusion in a dual-task paradigm. The proportion of visually influenced responses was severely, and selectively, reduced if participants were concurrently performing an unrelated visual or auditory task. In contrast with the assumption that crossmodal speech integration is automatic, our results suggest that these multisensory binding processes are subject to attentional demands.

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This study shows that 4- and 6-month-old infants can discriminate languages (English from French) just from viewing silently presented articulations. By the age of 8 months, only bilingual (French-English) infants succeed at this task. These findings reveal a surprisingly early preparedness for visual language discrimination and highlight infants' selectivity for retaining only necessary perceptual sensitivities.

The conventional view is that perceptual/cognitive development is an incremental process of acquisition. Several striking findings have revealed, however, that the sensitivity to non-native languages, faces, vocalizations, and music that is present early in life declines as infants acquire experience with native perceptual inputs. In the language domain, the decline in sensitivity is reflected in a process of perceptual narrowing that is thought to play a critical role during the acquisition of a native-language phonological system. Here, we provide evidence that such a decline also occurs in infant response to multisensory speech. We found that infant intersensory response to a non-native phonetic contrast narrows between 6 and 11 months of age, suggesting that the perceptual system becomes increasingly more tuned to key nativelanguage audiovisual correspondences. Our findings lend support to the notion that perceptual narrowing is a domain-general as well as a pan-sensory developmental process.audiovisual speech ͉ infants ͉ perceptual narrowing

Four cross-modal priming experiments in Spanish addressed the role of suprasegmental and segmental information in the activation of spoken words. Listeners heard neutral sentences ending with word fragments (e.g., princi-) and made lexical decisions on letter strings presented at fragment offset. Responses were compared for fragment primes that fully matched the spoken form of the initial portion of target words, versus primes that mismatched in a single element (stress pattern; one vowel; one consonant), versus control primes. Fully matching primes always facilitated lexical decision responses, in comparison to the control condition, while mismatching primes always produced inhibition. The respective strength of the contribution of stress, vowel, and consonant (one feature mismatch or more) information did not differ statistically. The results support a model of spoken-word recognition involving automatic activation of word forms and competition between activated words, in which the activation process is sensitive to all acoustic information relevant to the language's phonology.

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The mindless act of swatting a mosquito on the hand poses a remarkable challenge for the brain. Given that the primary somatosensory cortex maps skin location independently of arm posture [1, 2], the brain must realign tactile coordinates in order to locate the origin of the stimuli in extrapersonal space. Previous studies have highlighted the behavioral relevance of such an external mapping of touch, which results from combining somatosensory input with proprioceptive and visual cues about body posture [3-7]. However, despite the widely held assumption about the existence of this remapping process from somatotopic to external space and various findings indirectly suggesting its consequences [8-11], a demonstration of its changing time course and nature was lacking. We examined the temporal course of this multisensory interaction and its implications for tactile awareness in humans using a crossmodal cueing paradigm [12, 13]. What we show is that before tactile events are referred to external locations [12-15], a fleeting, unconscious image of the tactile sensation abiding to a somatotopic frame of reference rules performance. We propose that this early somatotopic "glimpse" arises from the initial feed-forward sweep of neural activity to the primary somatosensory cortex, whereas the later externally-based, conscious experience reflects the activity of a somatosensory network involving recurrent connections from association areas.