There is currently agreement that, in addition to the changes in external behaviour, suggestions presented in a hypnotic context may give rise to changes in subjective experience. Ye t, there is no general agreement about the theoretical framework within which these changes in experience should be explained. Though different theories about hypnosis overlap in many respects, there is still disagreement on whether reference to a specific internal state of the individual is necessary in order to explain these changes. We place the explanatory task in the context of a multilevel framework of explanation, which reveals that the disagreement between the 'state' and 'nonstate' view is about the level of description at which the phenomenon 'hypnosis' should be conceptualized. We propose a novel approach using the multilevel explanation which helps to formulate empirically testable hypotheses about the nature of hypnosis. We will outline the basic elements of such an approach and hope that our proposition will help hypnosis research to integrate with the multidisciplinary research on other phenomena of consciousness.

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Neuropsychological frontal lobe tests were used to compare individuals with high (n = 8) and low (n = 9) hypnotizability during both baseline and hypnosis conditions. Subjects were assessed on two hypnotic susceptibility scales and a test battery that included the Stroop test, word fluency to letter- and semantic-designated categories, tests of simple reaction time and choice reaction time, a vigilance task, and a questionnaire of 40 self-descriptive statements of focused attention. Effects for hypnotic susceptibility and hypnosis/control conditions were scant across the dependent variables. High hypnotizables scored higher on the questionnaire at baseline, and their performance on the word-fluency task during hypnosis was reduced to a greater extent than lows. Findings indicate that although the frontal area may play an important role regarding hypnotic response, the mechanisms seem to be much more complex than mere general inhibition.

Altered State of Consciousness'' (ASC) has been defined as a changed overall pattern of conscious experience, or as the subjective feeling and explicit recognition that one's own subjective experience has changed. We argue that these traditional definitions fail to draw a clear line between altered and normal states of consciousness (NSC). We outline a new definition of ASC and argue that the proper way to understand the concept of ASC is to regard it as a representational notion: the alteration that has happened is not an alteration of consciousness (or subjective experience) per se, but an alteration in the informational or representational relationships between consciousness and the world. An altered state of consciousness is defined as a state in which the neurocognitive background mechanisms of consciousness have an increased tendency to produce misrepresentations such as hallucinations, delusions, and memory distortions. Paradigm examples of such generally misrepresentational, temporary, and reversible states are dreaming, psychotic episodes, psychedelic drug experiences, some epileptic seizures, and hypnosis in highly hypnotizable subjects. The representational definition of ASC should be applied in the theoretical and empirical studies of ASCs to unify and clarify the conceptual basis of ASC research.