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Based on micro data on individual workers for the period 2000–2005, we show that wage differentials in the Netherlands are small but present. A large part of these differentials can be attributed to individual characteristics. Remaining effects are partially explained by variations in employment density, with an elasticity of about 4.8 percent, and by Marshall‐Arrow‐Romer externalities, where doubling the local share of a (two‐digit) industry results in a 2.9 percent higher productivity. We also find evidence for small negative effects of competition (Porter externalities) and diversity (Jacobs externalities).

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in 1The transaction costs perspective on standards as a source of trade and productivity growth Frank A.G. den Butter, Stefan P.T. Groot and Faroek Lazrak AbstractThis paper discusses the design, implementation and use of standards from the perspective of transaction costs economics. A proper design and implementation of standards may lead to a considerable reduction of transaction costs, which enhances trade and, consequently, economic welfare. A major example is the use of containers, which has drastically changed the worldwide transport infrastructure, and lowered the costs of transport of goods considerably. The example of containers also shows that network externalities play a major role in the use of standards, and that, on the other hand, worldwide standards with large sunk investment costs may lead to a lock-in. This may call for government intervention in the design and use of standards, and in the transition processes to new standards. The paper provides ample further examples of standards and on the role of the government, or clubs, with respect to these standards.