In this paper, we present a very simple and efficient endto-end

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Mobile Ad hoc Networks' (MANETs) properties present major vulnerabilities in security. The threats considered in MANETS are due to maliciousness that intentionally disrupt the network by using variety of attacks and due to selfishness of node which do not perform certain operations due to a wish to save power. In this paper, a co-operative security scheme called Reliable Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (RAODV) routing protocol based on local monitoring has been proposed to solve the problem of attack by malicious node as well as selfish behavior. RAODV behaves as AODV in the absence of attack and, detects and isolates misbehaving nodes in the presence of attack. Also it recovers from the attack when a misbehaving node leaves the network or becomes good.

In this paper, we present a very simple and efficient endto-end algorithm to handle wormhole attacks on ad hoc networks with variable ranges of communication. Most of the existing approaches focus on the prevention of wormholes between neighbors that trust each other. The known end-toend mechanisms assume that all the nodes of the network have same communication range. To the best of our knowledge this is the first attempt to handle variable ranges of the nodes in an ad hoc network where only the source and the destination are assumed to trust each other. We provide a lower bound on the minimum number of hops on a good route. Any path showing lesser hop-counts is shown to be under attack. Our algorithm requires every node to know its location. With very accurate GPS available, this assumption is not unreasonable. Since our protocol does not require speed or time, we do not need clock synchronization. In the absence of any error in the location, there are no false alarms i.e. no good paths are discarded. We have shown that the effect of error in the location information is negligible and can be ignored most of the times. The storage and computation overhead is low. For a path of length l, it takes only O(l) space and time.

Most of the protocols to defend ad hoc networks against wormhole attacks rely on 'trust your neighbor' relationship. In this paper, we present an end-to-end algorithm which is more efficient than the existing algorithm both in terms of space and time. As our algorithm does not require speed and time, we do not need clock synchronization.We prove that our algorithm is able to detect wormholes with tunnel length greater than or equal to {(2p − 1)/2p}k + 2/p r max , where p = r max /r min , r min is the minimum communication range, r max is the maximum communication range between any two nodes, and k is path length in terms of the number of hop-counts. However, with the help of simulations we show that we are able to detect wormholes even when tunnel length is much less than {(2p − 1)/2p}k + 2/p r max . We also studied the effect of error in the positions of the node on the wormhole detection capability. In the absence of any error in the location, there are no false alarms and in the presence of error the effect on detection capability is negligible.End-to-end protocol against wormhole attacks Security Comm. Networks 2011; 4:994-1002