In order to deliver the high data rates promised for 5G networks, mobile base stations need to be deployed in dense layouts. This results in increased inter-cell interference, which can be mitigated by leveraging centralized architectures in radio access networks. Nonetheless, centralizing all the processing requires prohibitively high link capacities for the fronthaul network connecting centralized and distributed units. In contrast, a static, partially-centralized architecture yields poor performance as it fails to adapt to instantaneous interference situations. In this work, we show that a dynamically centralized architecture enables drastic interference reductions even when using a very limited fronthaul network. We propose multiple algorithms to find the optimal centralization option and evaluate their performance on operator-grade hardware. In addition, owing to the dynamicity of the problem being solved, we provide a framework to decide on the best algorithm based on the trade-off between performance, cost, and adaptation time.
The architecture of the radio access network (RAN) in 5G features a functional split between centralized and distributed units, which can be leveraged to reduce inter-cell interference. Recent work proposes to dynamically adapt this split in accordance with the instantaneous interference situation experienced by all users. However, it is unclear whether performing this flexible adaptation is actually feasible, since the interference situation changes continuously as users move. In this work, we investigate the impact of mobility on the problem of dynamically selecting the optimal functional split. We employ a mobility simulator based on real street layouts and trace-derived traffic patterns to generate continuously varying interference situations. Then, we analyze how frequently the optimal functional split changes and how much the performance of previous splits differs from the new, optimal one. The results allow us to estimate the time required for a viable flexible functional split adaptation.
Technology Sovereignty is the capacity of a state to provide a technology to its constituents by developing or outsourcing the technology without causing a dangerous dependency on a particular contributor. There are several laws to monitor and govern networks that ensure the privacy and security of the consumers. However, they do not control the infrastructure or hardware dependency associated with these networks. A robust end-to-end network requires reliable hardware, software, and network architecture to handle multiple failures, increased users, and increased traffic demands. To handle multiple failures efficiently, there must be little to no dependency on the manufacturers involved. Therefore, the robustness of a network requires an adequate degree of sovereignty. In this study, Data Center Networks (DCN) are considered to understand the impact of choosing the hardware and software manufacturers appropriately on the DCN robustness. The unavailability of a component from a manufacturer or the presence of a software bug in the switches of a DCN can affect several flows, leading to multiple failures and huge losses of data. Thus, it is rational to find the best combination of manufacturers to create a network with the least dependency on the manufacturer(s). In this research, the sovereignty of a DCN is evaluated by considering different multiple-failure scenarios based on hardware and software manufacturers' reliability. Design guidelines for DCN operators are provided based on the findings of the analyses.
Technology Sovereignty aims at protecting the interests of the consumers belonging to a sovereign state. The new laws on network sovereignty monitor and govern networks inside a state. They protect the constitutional rights of citizens and ensure data security. However, they do not focus on the infrastructure and hardware associated with these networks. Ensuring a robust end-to-end network fuels the need for reliable hardware manufacturers and an appropriate network architecture that can handle multiple failures efficiently. To understand technological sovereignty in communication networks, the Data Center Network (DCN) is targeted as it is a critical part of the digital society. Data centers are dedicated physical facilities that act as storage houses for large amounts of data. Though several fault-tolerance studies have been performed in DCNs, none have studied the role of hardware manufacturers in DCN Sovereignty. The unavailability of components from a manufacturer can lead to multiple failures. So, it is necessary to build a sovereign DCN without creating a dependency on the manufacturer(s). In this work, to evaluate the sovereignty of a DCN, (i) Multiple failure scenarios depending on manufacturer reliability are evaluated, and (ii) Design guidelines on how to choose the number of hardware manufacturers and how to arrange them in the DCN topology are presented.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.