A major limitations for many heat engines is that their functioning demands on-line control, and/or an external fitting between environmental parameters (e.g. temperatures of thermal baths) and internal parameters of the engine. We study a model for an adaptive heat engine, where-due to feedback from the functional part-the engine's structure adapts to given thermal baths. Hence no on-line control and no external fitting are needed. The engine can employ unknown resources; it can also adapt to results of its own functioning that makes the bath temperatures closer. We determine thermodynamic costs of adaptation and relate them to the prior information available about the environment. We also discuss informational constraints on the structure-function interaction that are necessary for adaptation.

In this paper, we discuss three different response strategies to a disease outbreak and their economic implications in an age-structured population. We have utilized the classical age structured SIR-model, thus assuming that recovered people will not be infected again. Available resource dynamics is governed by the well-known logistic growth model, in which the reproduction coefficient depends on the disease outbreak spreading dynamics. We further investigate the feedback interaction of the disease spread dynamics and resource growth dynamics with the premise that the quality of treatment depends on the current economic situation. The very inclusion of mortality rates and economic considerations in the same model may be incongruous under certain positions, but in this model, we take a “realpolitik” approach by exploring all of these factors together as it is done in reality.

Statistical mechanics is based on the interplay between energy and entropy. Here we formalize this interplay via axiomatic bargaining theory (a branch of cooperative game theory), where entropy and negative energy are represented by utilities of two different players. Game-theoretic axioms provide a solution to the thermalization problem, which is complementary to existing physical approaches. We predict thermalization of a nonequilibrium statistical system employing the axiom of affine covariance, related to the freedom of changing initial points and dimensions for entropy and energy, together with the contraction invariance of the entropy-energy diagram. Thermalization to negative temperatures is allowed for active initial states. Demanding a symmetry between players determines the final state to be the Nash solution (well known in game theory), whose derivation is improved as a by-product of our analysis. The approach helps to retrodict nonequilibrium predecessors of a given equilibrium state.

The prisoner's dilemma game is the most known contribution of game theory into social sciences. Here we describe new implications of this game for transactional and transformative leadership. While the autocratic (Stackelberg's) leadership is inefficient for this game, we discuss a Paretooptimal scenario, where the leader L commits to react probabilistically to pure strategies of the follower F, which is free to make the first move. Offering F to resolve the dilemma, L is able to get a larger average pay-off. The exploitation can be stabilized via repeated interaction of L and F, and turns to be more stable than the egalitarian regime, where the pay-offs of L and F are equal. The total (summary) pay-off of the exploiting regime is never larger than in the egalitarian case. We discuss applications of this solution to a soft method of fighting corruption and to modeling the Machiavellian leadership. Whenever the defection benefit is large, the optimal strategies of F are mixed, while the summary pay-off is maximal. One mechanism for sustaining this solution is that L recognizes intentions of F.

It has been shown that the tumor population growth dynamics in a periodically varying environment can drastically differ from the one in a fixed environment. Thus, the environment of a tumor can potentially be manipulated to suppress cancer progression. Diverse evolutionary processes play vital roles in cancer progression and accordingly, understanding the interplay between these processes is essential in optimizing the treatment strategy. Somatic evolution and genetic instability result in intra‐tumor cell heterogeneity. Various models have been developed to analyze the interactions between different types of tumor cells. Here, models of density‐dependent interaction between different types of tumor cells under fast periodical environmental changes are examined. It is illustrated that tumor population densities, which vary on a slow time scale, are affected by fast environmental variations. Finally, the intriguing density‐dependent interactions in metastatic castration‐resistant prostate cancer (mCRPC) in which the different types of tumor cells are defined with respect to the production of and dependence on testosterone are discussed.

Selection in a time-periodic environment is modeled via the continuous-time two-player replicator dynamics, which for symmetric pay-offs reduces to the Fisher equation of mathematical genetics. For a sufficiently rapid and cyclic [fine-grained] environment, the time-averaged population frequencies are shown to obey a replicator dynamics with a non-linear fitness that is induced by environmental changes. The non-linear terms in the fitness emerge due to populations tracking their time-dependent environment. These terms can induce a stable polymorphism, though they do not spoil the polymorphism that exists already without them. In this sense polymorphic populations are more robust with respect to their time-dependent environments. The overall fitness of the problem is still given by its time-averaged value, but the emergence of polymorphism during genetic selection can be accompanied by decreasing mean fitness of the population. The impact of the uncovered polymorphism scenario on the models of diversity is examplified via the rock-paper-scissors dynamics, and also via the prisoner's dilemma in a time-periodic environment.

We argue that the definition of the thermodynamic work done on a charged particle by a timedependent electromagnetic field is an open problem, because the particle's Hamiltonian is not gaugeinvariant. The solution of this problem demands accounting for the source of the field. Hence we focus on the work done by a heavy body (source) on a lighter particle when the interaction between them is electromagnetic and relativistic. The work can be defined via the gauge-invariant kinetic energy of the source. We uncover a formulation of the first law (or the generalized work-energy theorem) which is derived from relativistic dynamics, has definite validity conditions, and relates the work to the particle's Hamiltonian in the Lorenz gauge. Thereby the thermodynamic work also relates to the mechanic work done by the Lorentz force acting on the source. The formulation of the first law is based on a specific separation of the overall energy into those of the source, particle and electromagnetic field. This separation is deduced from a consistent energy-momentum tensor. Hence it holds relativistic covariance and causality.

In this work, the cooperation problem between two populations in a periodically varying environment is discussed. In particular, the two‐population prisoner's dilemma game with periodically oscillating payoffs is discussed, such that the time‐average of these oscillations over the period of environmental variations vanishes. The possible overlaps of these oscillations generate completely new dynamical effects that drastically change the phase space structure of the two‐population evolutionary dynamics. Due to these effects, the emergence of some level of cooperators in both populations is possible under certain conditions on the environmental variations. In the domain of stable coexistence the dynamics of cooperators in each population form stable cycles. Thus, the cooperators in each population promote the existence of cooperators in the other population. However, the survival of cooperators in both populations is not guaranteed by a large initial fraction of them.