No abstract

While Quality of Life (QOL) has long been an explicit or implicit policy goal, adequate definition and measurement have been elusive. Diverse "objective" and "subjective" indicators across a range of disciplines and scales, and recent work on subjective well-being (SWB) surveys and the psychology of happiness have spurred renewed interest. Drawing from multiple disciplines, we present an integrative definition of QOL that combines measures of human needs with subjective well-being or happiness. QOL is proposed as a multiscale, multi-dimensional concept that contains interacting objective and subjective elements. We relate QOL to the opportunities that are provided to meet human needs in the forms of built, human, social and natural capital (in addition to time) and the policy options that are available to enhance these opportunities. Issues related to defining, measuring, and scaling these concepts are discussed, and a research agenda is elaborated. Policy implications include strategies for investing in opportunities to maximize QOL enhancement at the individual, community, and national scales.

No abstract

No abstract

The effects of income (money available to spend during the experimental session) on human choice were examined in a concurrent-schedule arrangement. Subjects were 7 nicotine-dependent smokers, and reinforcers were puffs on the subject's usual brand of cigarette ("own") and puffs on a less preferred brand of cigarette with equal nicotine content ("other"). Across sessions, income varied and the price of the two reinforcers was held constant, with the other puffs one fifth the price of the own puffs. As income increased, consumption of own puffs increased while consumption of the less expensive other puffs decreased. These effects of income on choice were highly consistent across subjects. For some subjects, however, income had little effect on total puff consumption. Finally, an additional condition examined whether price and income manipulations would have functionally equivalent effects on choice by repeating an income condition in which the price of the other brand was increased. Although the increased price of the other puffs decreased their consumption in 4 subjects, 2 subjects showed increased consumption of the other puffs at the higher price. The results, when defined in economic terms, indicate that the own puffs were a normal good (consumption and income are directly related), the other puffs were an inferior good (consumption and income are inversely related), and the direct relationship between consumption of the other puffs and their price is defined as a Giffengood effect. The latter result also suggests that for these 2 subjects, price and income manipulations had equivalent effects on choice. These results extend findings from previous studies that have examined the effects of income on choice responding to human subjects and drug reinforcers, and provide a framework for further experimental tests of the effects of income on human choice behavior. Methodological and theoretical implications for the study of choice and for behavioral pharmacology are discussed.

No abstract

No abstract

Standard economic arguments assume that individual preferences satisfy particular axioms of choice (e.g. transitivity or acyclicity). At the same time, preferences are taken as given for purposes of analysis. However, since preferences are formed, the process of formation will affect the preferences created. This article argues that the process of preference formation will not generally result in preferences satisfying the axioms of choice. This result follows from considering preference formation as an intrapersonal version of Sen's Paretian Liberal paradox. This result requires a number of conditions, which are re-interpreted in the setting of individual preference formation and are shown to be reasonable. Several plausible examples show that the impossibility arises in uncontrived and natural situations. The article then outlines the relation of these arguments to other concerns about preference rankings. It concludes that the burden carried in economics and in other disciplines by standard preference rankings or utility functions is misplaced: such rankings are likely to be available to individuals in straightforward circumstances. On the other hand, these conclusions buttress arguments for a conception of preferences that is richer than is possible in standard economics.