We conducted asset market experiments where one experienced subject (EH) interacts with five inexperienced subjects (1EH5H) to investigate how EHs change their price forecasts and trading strategies when faced with strategic uncertainty caused by inflows of inexperienced subjects. Only half the EHs initially forecasted prices deviating more from the fundamental values in 1EH5H than in the final round of the experiment in which they had previously participated. Furthermore, the majority of our EHs did not change their trading behaviour. Many EHs act as price stabilisers when the inflow of inexperienced subjects is not associated with other changes in market conditions.

We experimentally investigate the effect of a central bank buying bonds for cash in a quantitative easing (QE) operation. In our experiment, the bonds are perfect substitute for cash, and have a constant fundamental value (FV) which is not affected by QE in the rational expectations equilibrium. We found that QE raised the bond prices beyond those in the benchmark treatment without QE and these differences became larger as subjects gained experience. While subjects in the benchmark treatment learned to trade the bonds at its FV, those in treatments with QE became more convinced that QE boosts bond prices.

To what extent is the observed mispricing in experimental asset markets caused by strategic uncertainty and by confusion? We address this question by comparing subjects' initial price forecasts in two market environments: one with six human traders, and the other with one human and five computer traders. We find that both strategic uncertainty and confusion contribute equally to the median initial forecast deviation from the fundamental value. The effect of strategic uncertainty is greater for subjects with a perfect score in the Cognitive Reflection Test, and it is not significant for those with low scores.

To what extent is the observed mis-pricing in experimental asset markets caused by strategic uncertainty (SU) and by individual bounded rationality (IBR)? We address this question by comparing subjects initial price forecasts in two market environments -one with six human traders, and the other with one human and five computer traders. We find that both SU and IBR account equally for the median initial forecasts deviation from the fundamental values. The effect of SU is greater for subjects with a perfect score in the Cognitive Reflection Test, and it is not significant for those with low scores.

In this study, we investigate (a) whether eliciting future price forecasts influences market outcomes and (b) whether differences in the way in which subjects are incentivized to submit "accurate" price forecasts influence market outcomes as well as the forecasts in an experimental asset market. We consider four treatments: one without forecast elicitation and three with forecast elicitation. In two of the treatments with forecast elicitation, subjects are paid based on their performance in both forecasting and trading, while in the other treatment with forecast elicitations, they are paid based on only one of those factors, which is chosen randomly at the end of the experiment. We found no significant effect of forecast elicitation on market outcomes in the latter case. Thus, to avoid influencing the behavior of subjects and market outcomes by eliciting price forecasts, paying subjects based on either forecasting or trading performance chosen randomly at the end of the experiment is better than paying them based on both. In addition, we consider forecast-only experiments: one in which subjects are rewarded based on the number of accurate forecasts and the other in which they are rewarded based on a quadratic scoring rule. We found no significant difference in terms of forecasting performance between the two.