There are several locations, each of which is endowed with a resource that is specific to that location. Examples include coastal fisheries, oil fields, etc. Each agent will go to a single location and harvest some of the resource there. Several agents may go to each location. We assign harvesting rights based on preferences alone, though we later extend the model to accommodate private endowments of money. We find the best allocation rule in the class of rules that are strategy-proof, anonymous, and that satisfy a weak continuity property. We also find an ascending mechanism, similar to an auction, that implements the rule. The rule coincides with a special simulated price equilibrium, wherein agents buy their desired resource with tokens distributed by the social planner. Equilibrium price vectors form a lower semi-lattice and thus there is a unique minimal price vector. The equilibria associated with the minimal price vector are called min-price Walrasian equilibria. These equilibria form an essentially single-valued correspondence, and this correspondence is the rule we characterize.
There are several locations, each of which is endowed with a resource that is specific to that location. Examples include coastal fisheries, oil fields, etc. Each agent will go to a single location and harvest some of the resource there. Several agents may go to each location. We assign harvesting rights based on preferences alone, though we later extend the model to accommodate private endowments of money. We find the best allocation rule in the class of rules that are strategy-proof, anonymous, and that satisfy a weak continuity property. We also find an ascending mechanism, similar to an auction, that implements the rule. The rule coincides with a special simulated price equilibrium, wherein agents buy their desired resource with tokens distributed by the social planner. Equilibrium price vectors form a lower semi-lattice and thus there is a unique minimal price vector. The equilibria associated with the minimal price vector are called min-price Walrasian equilibria. These equilibria form an essentially single-valued correspondence, and this correspondence is the rule we characterize.
We identify a large subdomain, D, of quasilinear economies on which any efficient exchange rule will be generically (in the Baire sense) manipulable. For generic economies outside of D, we find rules that are locally non-manipulable. The interior of the set D consists of all economies in which competitive equilibrium would prescribe that all agents consume a positive quantity of money. Since we study quasilinear preferences, this is the domain of primary interest. Our locally nonmanipulable rules rely on the existence of traders who are willing to sell all of their cash and absorb the imbalances in the trading of the commodity.
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