That there is a theoretical distinction between context-dependent and context-independent aspects of utterance interpretation has become a standard assumption in current theories of meaning; however, how and where to draw this distinction has been the subject of considerable debate. In the current study, we investigate whether speakers can systematically distinguish between what is said and what is implicated (Grice 1989 [1967]) using a novel truth-value judgment paradigm across a wide range of implicature types. We found that, by providing participants with a clear set of judgment criteria, including the adoption of an objective third-person perspective, we were able to enhance their ability to distinguish conversational implicature from truth-conditional meaning. In addition, we found that none of the implicature types we investigated was either consistently incorporated into or consistently excluded from what is said. Instead, our findings revealed considerable variation in frequency of incorporation across implicature types in ways that do not correspond straightforwardly to the various taxonomies of implicature types proposed in the literature.
Scalar implicaure is often offered as the exemplar of generalized conversational implicature. However, despite the wealth of literature devoted to both the phenomenon in general and to specific examples, little attention has been paid to the various factors that may influence the generation and interpretation of scalar implicatures. This study employs the “Literal Lucy” methodology developed in Larson et al. (in press) to further investigate these factors in a controlled experimental setting. The results of our empirical investigation suggest that the type of scale employed affects whether or not speakers judge a particular scalar implicature to be part of the truth-conditional meaning of an utterance. Moreover, we found that features of the conversational context in which the implicature is situated also play an important role. Specifically, we have found that the number of scalar values evoked in the discourse context plays a significant role in the interpretation of scalar implicatures generated from gradable adjective scales but not other scale types. With respect to the effects of scale type, we have found that gradable adjectives were less frequently incorporated into truth-conditional meaning than cardinals, quantificational items, and ranked orderings. Additionally, ranked orderings were incorporated less than cardinals. Thus, the results from the current study show that the interpretation of scalar implicature is sensitive to both the associated scale type and discourse context.
In this article, robust evidence is provided showing that an individual's moral character can contribute to the aesthetic quality of their appearance, as well as being beautiful or ugly itself. It is argued that this evidence supports two main conclusions. First, moral beauty and ugliness reside on the inside, and beauty and ugliness are not perceptiondependent as a result; and, second, aesthetic perception is affected by moral information, and thus moral beauty and ugliness are on the outside as well.
I argue that the main existing accounts of the relationship between the beauty of environmental entities and their moral standing are mistaken in important ways. Beauty does not, as has been suggested by optimists, confer intrinsic moral standing. Nor is it the case, as has been suggested by pessimists, that beauty at best provides an anthropocentric source of moral standing that is commensurate with other sources of pleasure. I present arguments and evidence that show that the appreciation of beauty tends to cause a transformational state of mind that is more valuable than mere pleasure, but that leads us to falsely represent beautiful entities as being sentient and, in turn, as having intrinsic moral standing. To this extent, beauty is not, then, a source of intrinsic moral standing; it’s a source of a more important anthropocentric value than has hitherto been acknowledged.
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