We study the interplay between stock price stability and the information environment following periods of institutional distraction. Using a large panel dataset over the years 1982–2016, we find that the level of ownership by distracted institutions significantly explains crash risk independent of additional determinants identified in prior research. Distraction has a pronounced effect on crash risk among firms that are subject to greater information opacity. Furthermore, we identify a causal impact of institutional distraction on the quality of the information environment that persists over the year following the distraction period. This heightened information asymmetry impedes investors’ ability to process information, leading investors to overreact to bad news.

We find that changes in managerial tone predict firm corporate investment activities. Tone changes within the Management Discussion and Analysis section of the 10-K are positively related to subsequent capital investments and M&A activity. We find the predictive content of tone changes to be present at the firm and industry-levels, and when accounting for alternative sources of incremental information associated with firm investment activities. Our findings broaden the scope of information encapsulated by changes in financial statement tone.

In this paper, I assess the empirical relation between analyst recommendation decisions and market technicals. Research shows market technicals have predictive content that leads to abnormal returns. Recent survey evidence, however, shows analysts' rank technical signals as having relatively little usefulness in forming their recommendations, leading them to underweight the information content of technical signals. I find lagged positive stock price trends are associated with a greater likelihood of consensus recommendation upgrade. Furthermore, I show market technicals enhance the investment value of consensus recommendations. Overall, I demonstrate that market technicals are an important complement to analyst recommendations.

PurposeThis paper aims to examine the effect employee performance has on subsequent corporate cash holdings.Design/methodology/approachThe authors utilize panel data estimation, including an instrumental variable approach, to identify the relation between employee performance and subsequent corporate cash holdings. These panel data consist of 11,087 firm-year observations over the period 1992 to 2015.FindingsThe authors document a positive and statistically significant relation between firm employee performance and subsequent cash balances. A one standard deviation increase in employee performance is associated with an increase in cash holdings ranging from 1 to 2 percent. The findings support the view that firms seek to accommodate the preferences of better performing employees, thereby requiring greater levels of cash. This positive relation is most evident among firms with low bond ratings and firms with low managerial ability – characteristics that are indicative of a firm's ability to access capital markets.Originality/valueBetter corporate governance of the firm is commonly associated with lower levels of cash. The findings of this paper, however, suggest that holding greater levels of cash may be a consequence of corporate efforts to accommodate the needs of their employees. The predictive content of employee performance is orthogonal to existing determinants of corporate cash holdings shown in the literature. Furthermore, this paper shows the potential for firm cash balances to be an alternative and transparent measure that signals better employee performance and more socially responsible firm behavior.

Firms targeted by hedge fund activists experience significantly higher returns when there are fewer external monitors in place at the target firm. Using analyst coverage and institutional ownership as measures of external monitoring presence, we find that low‐monitored activist targets experience abnormal returns 17.52% above that of high‐monitored targets in the 2‐year period following the initial campaign start date. The significant effect of external monitoring remains after controlling for target firm and activist characteristics. We also document improved operating performance and an increased monitoring presence at low‐monitored target firms across the same 2‐year period, consistent with the observed market performance.