As of the end of 2020, the State of Israel, with a population of 9.3 million, had administered more COVID-19 vaccine doses than all countries aside from China, the US, and the UK. Moreover, Israel had administered almost 11.0 doses per 100 population, while the next highest rates were 3.5 (in Bahrain) and 1.4 (in the United Kingdom). All other countries had administered less than 1 dose per 100 population.While Israel’s rollout of COVID-19 vaccinations was not problem-free, its initial phase had clearly been rapid and effective. A large number of factors contributed to this early success, and they can be divided into three major groups.The first group of factors consists of long-standing characteristics of Israel which are extrinsic to health care. They include: Israel’s small size (in terms of both area and population), a relatively young population, relatively warm weather in December 2020, a centralized national system of government, and well-developed infrastructure for implementing prompt responses to large-scale national emergencies.The second group of factors are also long-standing, but they are health-system specific. They include: the organizational, IT and logistical capacities of Israel’s community-based health care providers, the availability of a cadre of well-trained, salaried, community-based nurses who are directly employed by those providers, a tradition of effective cooperation between government, health plans, hospitals, and emergency care providers – particularly during national emergencies; and support tools and decisionmaking frameworks to support vaccination campaigns.The third group consists of factors that are more recent and are specific to the COVID-19 vaccination effort. They include: the mobilization of special government funding for vaccine purchase and distribution, timely contracting for a large amount of vaccines relative to Israel’s population, the use of simple, clear and easily implementable criteria for determining who had priority for receiving vaccines in the early phases of the distribution process, a creative technical response that addressed the demanding cold storage requirements of the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine, and well-tailored outreach efforts to encourage Israelis to sign up for vaccinations and then show up to get vaccinated.While many of these facilitating factors are not unique to Israel, part of what made the Israeli rollout successful was its combination of facilitating factors (as opposed to each factor being unique separately) and the synergies it created among them. Moreover, some high-income countries (including the US, the UK, and Canada) are lacking several of these facilitating factors, apparently contributing to the slower pace of the rollout in those countries.

Every country has vulnerable populations that require special attention from policymakers in their response to a pandemic. This is because those populations may have specific characteristics, culture and behaviours that can accelerate the spread of the virus, and they usually have less access to healthcare, particularly in times of crisis. In order to carry out a comprehensive national intervention plan, policy makers should be sensitive to the needs and lifestyles of these groups, while taking into account structural and cultural gaps.In the context of Israel, the two most prominent and well-defined minority groups are the ultra-Orthodox Jewish community and parts of the Arab population. The government was slow to recognize the unique position of these two groups, public pressure eventually led to a response that was tailored to the ultra-Orthodox community and during the month of Ramadan a similar response has been implemented among the Arab community.

As of March 31, 2021, Israel had administered 116 doses of vaccine for COVID-19 per 100 population (of any age) – far more than any other OECD country. It was also ahead of other OECD countries in terms of the share of the population that had received at least one vaccination (61%) and the share that had been fully vaccinated (55%). Among Israelis aged 16 and over, the comparable figures were 81 and 74%, respectively. In light of this, the objectives of this article are: To describe and analyze the vaccination uptake through the end of March 2021 To identify behavioral and other barriers that likely affected desire or ability to be vaccinated To describe the efforts undertaken to overcome those barriers Israel’s vaccination campaign was launched on December 20, and within 2.5 weeks, 20% of Israelis had received their first dose. Afterwards, the pace slowed. It took an additional 4 weeks to increase from 20 to 40% and yet another 6 weeks to increase from 40 to 60%. Initially, uptake was low among young adults, and two religious/cultural minority groups - ultra-Orthodox Jews and Israeli Arabs, but their uptake increased markedly over time.In the first quarter of 2021, Israel had to enhance access to the vaccine, address a moderate amount of vaccine hesitancy in its general population, and also address more intense pockets of vaccine hesitancy among young adults and religious/cultural minority groups. A continued high rate of infection during the months of February and March, despite broad vaccination coverage at the time, created confusion about vaccine effectiveness, which in turn contributed to vaccine hesitancy. Among Israeli Arabs, some residents of smaller villages encountered difficulties in reaching vaccination sites, and that also slowed the rate of vaccination.The challenges were addressed via a mix of messaging, incentives, extensions to the initial vaccine delivery system, and other measures. Many of the measures addressed the general population, while others were targeted at subgroups with below-average vaccination rates. Once the early adopters had been vaccinated, it took hard, creative work to increase population coverage from 40 to 60% and beyond.Significantly, some of the capacities and strategies that helped Israel address vaccine hesitancy and geographic access barriers are different from those that enabled it to procure, distribute and administer the vaccines. Some of these strategies are likely to be relevant to other countries as they progress from the challenges of securing an adequate vaccine supply and streamlining distribution to the challenge of encouraging vaccine uptake.

Background: Hospital professionals are "dual agents" who may face dilemmas between their commitment to patients’ clinical needs and hospitals’ financial sustainability. This study examines whether and how hospital professionals balance or reconcile clinical and economic considerations in their decision-making in two countries with activity-based payment systems. Methods: We conducted 46 semi-structured interviews with hospital managers, chief physicians and practicing physicians in five German and five Israeli hospitals in 2018/2019. We used thematic analysis to identify common topics and patterns of meaning. Results: Hospital professionals report many situations in which activity-based payment incentivizes proper treatment, and clinical and economic considerations are aligned. This is the case when efficiency can be improved, eg, by curbing unnecessary expenditures or specializing in certain procedures. When considerations are misaligned, hospital professionals have developed a range of strategies that may contribute to balancing competing considerations. These include ‘reshaping management,’ such as better planning of the entire course of treatment and improvement of the coding; and ‘reframing decision-making,’ which involves working with averages and developing tool-kits for decision-making. Conclusion: Misalignment of economic and clinical considerations does not necessarily have negative implications, if professionals manage to balance and reconcile them. Context is important in determining if considerations can be reconciled or not. Reconciling strategies are fragile and can be easily disrupted depending on context. Creating tool-kits for better decision-making, planning the treatment course in advance, working with averages, and having interdisciplinary teams to think together about ways to improve efficiency can help mitigate dilemmas of hospital professionals.

Provider payment mechanisms were adjusted in many countries in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Our objective was to review adjustments for hospitals and healthcare professionals across 20 countries. We developed an analytical framework distinguishing between payment adjustments compensating income loss and those covering extra costs related to COVID-19. Information was extracted from the Covid-19 Health System Response Monitor (HSRM) and classified according to the framework. We found that income loss was not a problem in countries where professionals were paid by salary or capitation and hospitals received global budgets. In countries where payment was based on activity, income loss was compensated through budgets and higher fees. New FFS payments were introduced to incentivize remote services. Payments for COVID-19 related costs included new fees for out- and inpatient services but also new PD and DRG tariffs for hospitals. Budgets covered the costs of adjusting wards, creating new (ICU) beds, and hiring staff. We conclude that public payers assumed most of the COVID-19-related financial risk. In view of future pandemics policymakers should work to increase resilience of payment systems by: (1) having systems in place to rapidly adjust payment systems; (2) being aware of the economic incentives created by these adjustments such as cost-containment or increasing the number of patients or services, that can result in unintended consequences such as risk selection or overprovision of care; and (3) periodically evaluating the effects of payment adjustments on access and quality of care.

This paper conducts a comparative review of the (curative) health systems’ response taken by Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain during the first six months of the COVID-19 pandemic. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, these Mediterranean countries shared similarities in terms of health system resources, which were low compared to the EU/OECD average. We distill key policy insights regarding the governance tools adopted to manage the pandemic, the means to secure sufficient physical infrastructure and workforce capacity and some financing and coverage aspects. We performed a qualitative analysis of the evidence reported to the ‘Health System Response Monitor’ platform of the European Observatory by country experts. We found that governance in the early stages of the pandemic was undertaken centrally in all the Mediterranean countries, even in Italy and Spain where regional authorities usually have autonomy over health matters. Stretched public resources prompted countries to deploy “flexible” intensive care unit capacity and health workforce resources as agile solutions. The private sector was also utilized to expand resources and health workforce capacity, through special public-private partnerships. Countries ensured universal coverage for COVID-19-related services, even for groups not usually entitled to free publicly financed health care, such as undocumented migrants. We conclude that flexibility, speed and adaptive management in health policy responses were key to responding to immediate needs during the COVID-19 pandemic. Financial barriers to accessing care as well as potentially higher mortality rates were avoided in most of the countries during the first wave. Yet it is still early to assess to what extent countries were able to maintain essential services without undermining equitable access to high quality care.

Historically, Israel paid its non-profit hospitals on a perdiem (PD) basis. Recently, like other OECD countries, Israel has moved to activity-based payments. While most countries have adopted a diagnostic related group (DRG) payment system, Israel has chosen a Procedure-Related Group (PRG) system. This differs from the DRG system because it classifies patients by procedure rather than diagnosis. In Israel, the PRG system was found to be more feasible given the lack of data and information needed in the DRG classification system. The Ministry of Health (MoH) chose a payment scheme that depends only on inhouse creation of PRG codes and costing, thus avoiding dependence on hospital data. The PRG tariffs are priced by a joint Health and Finance Ministry commission and updated periodically. Moreover, PRGs are believed to achieve the same main efficiency objectives as DRGs: increasing the volume of activity, shortening unnecessary hospitalization days, and reducing the gaps between the costs and prices of activities. The PRG system is being adopted through an incremental reform that started in 2002 and was accelerated in 2010. The Israeli MoH involved the main players in the hospital market in the consolidation of this potentially controversial reform in order to avoid opposition. The reform was implemented incrementally in order to preserve the balance of resource allocation and overall expenditures of the system, thus becoming budget neutral. Yet, as long as gaps remain between marginal costs and prices of procedures, PRGs will not attain all their objectives. Moreover, it is still crucial to refine PRG rates to reflect the severity of cases, in order to tackle incentives for selection of patients within each procedure.

Since 1995 universal healthcare coverage has been provided in Israel through National Health Insurance (NHI). Although the country has lower rates of health spending than most OECD countries, the NHI Law stipulates that a broad benefits package will be provided by four competing Health Plans (HPs). These third-party payers manage healthcare utilization and cost through mechanisms that affect both provider and consumer behavior. Cost Containment is one of their main organizational objectives. The Ministry of Health (MoH) supervises HPs to ensure that they provide their members with adequate healthcare of high quality in accordance with the NHI Law and uphold the principles of efficiency and equity. In this paper we report on a policy instrument recently introduced by the MoH which enables it to share some of its responsibility for supervision with the insureds. This policy instrument is a website launched in 2014 that gives access to transparent information about the coverage of the NHI and voluntary health insurance (VHI) benefits packages. The idea is to empower insureds with knowledge and awareness of their rights and eligibility to benefits, so they can demand them from the HPs and/or private insurers; if refused, they can refer the case to the supervisor (the MoH). This policy instrument addresses market failures related to information asymmetry and can potentially improve competition among the HPs and within the VHI market.