Many seemingly unrelated protein families share common folds. Theoretical models based on structure designability have suggested that a few folds should be very common while many others have low probability. In agreement with the predictions of these models, we show that the distribution of observed protein families over different folds can be modeled with a highly-stretched exponential. Our results suggest that there are approximately 4,000 possible folds, some so unlikely that only approximately 2,000 folds existing among naturallyoccurring proteins. Due to the large number of extremely rare folds, constructing a comprehensive database of all existent folds would be difficult. Constructing a database of the most-likely folds representing the vast majority of protein families would be considerably easier. Proteins 1999;35:408-414.1999 Wiley-Liss, Inc.

Many seemingly unrelated protein families share common folds. Theoretical models based on structure designability have suggested that a few folds should be very common while many others have low probability. In agreement with the predictions of these models, we show that the distribution of observed protein families over different folds can be modeled with a highly-stretched exponential. Our results suggest that there are approximately 4,000 possible folds, some so unlikely that only approximately 2,000 folds existing among naturallyoccurring proteins. Due to the large number of extremely rare folds, constructing a comprehensive database of all existent folds would be difficult. Constructing a database of the most-likely folds representing the vast majority of protein families would be considerably easier. Proteins 1999;35:408-414.1999 Wiley-Liss, Inc.

Providing reliable and surreptitious communications is difficult in the presence of adaptive and resourceful state level censors. In this paper we introduce Tithonus, a framework that builds on the Bitcoin blockchain and network to provide censorship-resistant communication mechanisms. In contrast to previous approaches, we do not rely solely on the slow and expensive blockchain consensus mechanism but instead fully exploit Bitcoin's peer-to-peer gossip protocol. We develop adaptive, fast and cost effective data communication solutions that camouflage client requests into inconspicuous Bitcoin transactions. We propose solutions to securely request and transfer content, with unobservability and censorship resistance, and free, pay-peraccess and subscription based payment options. When compared to state-of-the-art Bitcoin writing solutions, Tithonus reduces the cost of transferring data to censored clients by 2 orders of magnitude and increases the goodput by 3 to 5 orders of magnitude. We show that Tithonus client initiated transactions are hard to detect, while server initiated transactions cannot be censored without creating split world problems to the Bitcoin blockchain.

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Stratum, the de-facto mining communication protocol used by blockchain based cryptocurrency systems, enables miners to reliably and efficiently fetch jobs from mining pool servers. In this paper we exploit Stratum's lack of encryption to develop passive and active attacks on Bitcoin's mining protocol, with important implications on the privacy, security and even safety of mining equipment owners. We introduce StraTap and ISP Log attacks, that infer miner earnings if given access to miner communications, or even their logs. We develop BiteCoin, an active attack that hijacks shares submitted by miners, and their associated payouts. We build BiteCoin on WireGhost, a tool we developed to hijack and surreptitiously maintain Stratum connections. Our attacks reveal that securing Stratum through pervasive encryption is not only undesirable (due to large overheads), but also ineffective: an adversary can predict miner earnings even when given access to only packet timestamps. Instead, we devise Bedrock, a minimalistic Stratum extension that protects the privacy and security of mining participants. We introduce and leverage the mining cookie concept, a secret that each miner shares with the pool and includes in its puzzle computations, and that prevents attackers from reconstructing or hijacking the puzzles. We have implemented our attacks and collected 138MB of Stratum protocol traffic from mining equipment in the US and Venezuela. We show that Bedrock is resilient to active attacks even when an adversary breaks the crypto constructs it uses. Bedrock imposes a daily overhead of 12.03s on a single pool server that handles mining traffic from 16,000 miners.