Little is known about the relation between entrepreneurship and the extent of psychiatric symptoms. Validated psychiatric symptom scores are seldom used for non-clinical reasons. One prevalent symptom that deserves our interest is Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). ADHD is a developmental disorder characterized by inattentiveness and hyperactivity that has been linked to occupational choice and performance. Building on the person-environment fit literature, we hypothesize that individuals who exhibit behavior associated with ADHD are more likely to have entrepreneurial intentions. Using a sample of 10,104 students enrolled in higher education, we can confirm our prediction that students with a higher level of ADHD-like behavior are more likely to have entrepreneurial intentions. Additionally, we show that risk taking propensity is a mediator that partly explains this positive effect. Our study points to the importance of behavioral tendencies associated with developmental disorders, when making entrepreneurship decisions. Our study contributes to the literature on the determinants of entrepreneurship, which so far has largely neglected the effects of psychiatric symptoms on entrepreneurship.Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article

The influence of the state on firms in the global economy is alive and well. States have become dominant owners of companies in many countries around the world. Firms have also increasingly established political connections to access resources and improve their competitive positions. Nonetheless, our understanding of how state ownership and political connections affect firm performance remains limited and marked by conflicting findings. Using meta-analytical techniques on a sample of 210 studies spanning 139 countries, we examine two key research questions: (a) How do state ownership and political connections affect firm strategies and financial performance? and (b) How does firm-level strategic decision making mediate the relationships between state ownership, political connections, and firm financial performance? Our findings show that state ownership has a small negative effect on firm financial performance and that political connections have no direct consequences for performance. However, we find evidence that both state ownership and political connections have a profound effect on the strategies firms pursue, such as financial leverage, R&D intensity, and internationalization, and that these strategies play a mediating role in the state ownership–firm performance relationship. We conclude with some suggestions for fruitful future research in further connecting these two important and timely research fields.

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An initial public offering (IPO) represents a unique milestone in the lifecycle of a firm. Yet, our understanding of the IPO phenomenon remains incomplete and marked by mixed findings. Using meta-analytical techniques on a sample of 123 empirical studies, we examine the factors that influence the short-term outcomes (i.e., underpricing and proceeds) and the long-term outcomes (i.e., financial performance and risk) of IPO firms. Our efforts yield few significant results for antecedents that prior research had proposed as effective signals of IPO firm quality, and we thus conclude that signaling theory is limited in its ability to capture the IPO process. Our findings, however, provide preliminary support for our contention that stakeholders influence short-term IPO outcomes depending on their temporal orientation. We also find strong support for our prediction that the IPO has consequences for long-term firm development. While high underpricing positively affects long-term firm performance, it also heightens long-term firm risk. Large proceeds result in higher long-term firm performance and lower firm risk, but they come at the expense of a higher percentage of equity being traded during the IPO.

Research Summary We argue that state ownership is a crucial policy instrument for alleviating what is perhaps the most important principal–principal (PP) agency problem around the globe: private benefits of control (PBC). Our results illustrate that states reduce PBC in the companies in which they acquire controlling ownership positions. We also examine how legal and political institutions influence the extent to which states accomplish this goal. Antiself‐dealing legal regulations make states more effective in their efforts to constrain PBC, while political constraints make them less effective. Regimes with high state capacity appear not to prioritize PBC reduction. We test and corroborate these ideas in a sample of 1,354 control transactions across 54 countries. Managerial Summary The one‐sided appropriation of wealth by dominant owners is arguably the biggest threat to minority shareholders around the globe. An important question that has thus far remained unaddressed is whether state ownership of firms increases or decreases the extraction of these so‐called PBC. By investigating a large number of transactions involving the transfer of corporate control in 54 countries, we find that state acquirers of controlling ownership positions generally respect minority shareholder rights more than other types of new controlling shareholders. This effect is stronger in countries with strong legal protection of minority shareholders. However, political constraints make it more challenging for state acquirers to keep PBC in check while “strong” states may (mis)use the firms they invest in as policy vehicles.