Purpose Researchers have explored contextual antecedents influencing engagement at work; yet, theory and empirical evidence suggest some individuals are more or less engaged than others. Using a relational framework based on attachment theory, the purpose of this paper is to suggest that relational models influence engagement through their influence on psychological availability and psychological safety. Study 1 examined whether attachment influences variability in engagement. Study 2 examined whether these effects could be replicated, and whether attachment influences engagement via individuals’ psychological availability and safety. Design/methodology/approach Two field studies using online self-report surveys (Study 1 n=203; Study 2 n=709). Findings Attachment-avoidance and attachment-anxiety were independently associated with lower levels of engagement, and psychological conditions mediated these relationships. Research limitations/implications Relational models explain predictable variability in engagement. Employees’ ability to engage may be constrained or facilitated by their stable relational models of attachment. Originality/value The study is one of the few examining individual differences in engagement.

SUMMARY: On August 16, 2011, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) issued a concept release seeking comments on ways to enhance auditor independence. The Board notes that higher failure rates in new audit engagements might be linked to unrealistic pricing. The Board's concern is that a new auditor might be more susceptible to management pressure if initial-year audit fees are set artificially low. Prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, empirical evidence shows that auditors discounted their initial-year audit fees. This practice, known as lowballing, was expected to decrease significantly after the enactment of SOX. Indeed, findings in Huang, Raghunandan, and Rama (2009) seem to confirm that Big 4 auditors charged a fee premium on new auditor-client relationships in 2006. However, it is not clear if more recent post-SOX initial-year audits are free of lowballing. We investigate whether lowballing exists in new auditor-client relationships in an “extended” post-SOX environment for the years 2007 to 2010. Our results suggest that both Big 4 and non-Big 4 accounting firms discounted their initial-year audit fees during our sample period (2007–2010). These findings should be of interest to the PCAOB as it searches for ways to bolster auditor independence. Data Availability: Available from public sources.

SYNOPSIS: In the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) project, “Disclosure of Certain Loss Contingencies,” a central issue underlying the debate is whether existing implementation of FASB Accounting Standards Codification Topic 450-20 (previously Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5) provides sufficient and timely information to financial statement users. The Exposure Draft explains that constituents’ assertions of inadequate disclosures are the primary motive underlying the FASB’s re-examination of this issue (see, for example, page v of the Exposure Draft). However, little actual data are available to indicate the extent of the alleged problem. This manuscript presents the results of a study undertaken to provide such data. For a sample of litigation-related losses, we find a surprisingly large incidence of non-disclosure of contingent losses that cannot be readily explained. Moreover, even where there is disclosure, we find many cases where firms do not provide estimates of expected losses, presumably under the permitted exception for cases where firms claim to be unable to estimate the magnitude of expected losses. On the other hand, we find relatively frequent disclosure of the items called for in the Exposure Draft, consistent with the conjecture that at least some of these items are being demanded by users.

I investigate non-announcing firms' disclosure patterns in response to information transfers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that non-announcing managers take steps to shield their firms from their peers' bad news or to imitate their peers' good news. However, existing research on information transfers seems to ignore this aspect. Using announcements of dividend changes, I find that non-announcing managers routinely intervene in the information transfer process by disclosing good news to dispel negative information transfers on their firms' share prices. More importantly, I find that industry concentration plays a significant role in managers' reactions. In particular, managers in more-concentrated industries are more likely to disclose good news following a rival's good news, while managers in less-concentrated industries are more likely to disclose good news following a rival's bad news. Finally, my results accentuate the role of disclosure by documenting that managers who intervene significantly reduce (increase) negative (positive) information transfers on their firms' share prices.

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