Science education reform has long focused on assessing student inquiry, and there has been progress in developing tools specifically with respect to experimentation and argumentation. We suggest the need for attention to another aspect of inquiry, namely mechanistic reasoning. Scientific inquiry focuses largely on understanding causal mechanisms that underlie natural phenomena. We have adapted an account of mechanism from philosophy of science studies in professional science [Machamer, P., Darden, D., & Craver, C. F., (2000). Thinking about mechanisms. Philosophy of Science, 67, 1–25] to develop a framework for discourse analysis that aids in identifying and analyzing students' mechanistic reasoning. We analyze a discussion among first‐grade students about falling objects (1) to illustrate the generativity of the framework, (2) to demonstrate that mechanistic reasoning is abundantly present even in these young students, and (3) to show that mechanistic reasoning is episodic in their discourse. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Sci Ed 92:499–525, 2008

The Next Generation Science Standards (NGSS) [Achieve, Inc. []] represent a broad consensus that teaching and learning expectations must change. Rather than memorizing and reciting information, students are now expected to engage in science practices to develop a deep understanding of core science ideas. While we want to share in the optimism about NGSS, the standards are not a silver bullet for transforming science classrooms. They are, instead, another reform document designed to suggest opportunities for students to actively engage in knowledge construction themselves—to be doers of science, rather than receivers of facts. A foundational contradiction underlies these efforts—while we want students to do science, we seem to mean that students should mimic practices others have selected as important to learn, and content others have selected as foundational. As a result, students are rarely positioned with epistemic agency: the power to shape the knowledge production and practices of a community [Stroupe [] Science Education 98:487–516]. We argue that unless the field tackles significant questions around precisely how students can be active agents in knowledge construction, we will likely continue to implement learning environments that position students as receivers of scientific facts and practices, even as classrooms adopt NGSS. In this conceptual analysis article, we unpack the construct of “epistemic agency” and its relationship to the NGSS, using a vignette to illustrate how students are typically positioned in researcher‐developed curricula. The vignette, which describes a seventh‐grade class exploring which of two lakes is more at risk for invasion by the spiny water flea, provides an exemplar of what we take to be a loose consensus about learning environments consistent with the NGSS. However, when we look beneath the surface of the consensus, the vignette reveals contradictions and unresolved issues around epistemic agency.

In recent years, science education researchers have increasingly studied the ways in which students "make sense" of science. However, although researchers might all agree intuitively on what it looks like, the literature on sensemaking is theoretically fragmented.In this paper, we address this fragmentation by proposing a coherent definition, arguing that sensemaking is the process of building an explanation to resolve a perceived gap or conflict in knowledge. We then present an overview of three primary approaches to describing sensemaking in the science education research literature, arguing that this body of literature has conceptualized sensemaking as a stance toward science learning, a cognitive process, and a particular form of discourse, and showing how the definition incorporates each conceptualization. We conclude by describing how sensemaking is distinct from general categories of activities like "thinking," "learning," and several scientific practices. We also highlight the implications of this definition for science instruction and future sensemaking research.

ABSTRACT:When teachers or students assess the quality of ideas in science classes, they do so mostly based on textbook correctness; ideas are good to the extent they align with or lead to the content as presented in the textbook or curriculum. Such appeals to authority are at odds with the values and practices within the disciplines of science. There has been significant amount of attention to this mismatch in the science education research literature, primarily with respect to experimentation and argumentation as core disciplinary means of assessing ideas. In this article, we call attention to another aspect of scientific reasoning: a focus on causal mechanisms in explaining natural phenomena. We highlight examples and research from the history and philosophy of science to clarify what scientists mean by "mechanism" and to make the case for its centrality. We then present an excerpt from a second-grade class in which a student provides an incorrect mechanistic explanation, and the teacher gives priority to textbook correctness. As the conversation proceeds, the student shifts from mechanistic sensemaking to quoting terminology she does not understand. We argue that attention to mechanism in the classroom would better support student reasoning and better reflect disciplinary epistemology.

In this work we use research from science education on teacher framing and work from mathematics education on teacher noticing to develop new approaches to modeling teacher cognition. The framing literature proposes a dynamic cognitive model of teaching in which teacher epistemological framing, or moment-to-moment understanding of what is going on with respect to knowledge and learning in the classroom, drives much of teacher practice. The teacher noticing literature documents patterns and trends in teachers' attention during instruction. We suggest first that noticing patterns, particularly local noticing patterns, can be leveraged to make inferences about teacher framing that maintain sensitivity to its dynamics but are also more reliable than existing analytic approaches. Second, we suggest that understanding noticing as driven by framing requires researchers to anticipate, allow for, and capitalize on the fact that teachers are capable of multiple, internally consistent variations in noticing at any given time. To illustrate these claims we present an analysis of one high school biology teacher who implemented a new digital recording technology in her classroom. Using the data from that implementation we identify two distinct local patterns in the teacher's noticing and from those patterns infer two different epistemological frames, one that she adopts during lab work and another during class discussions. We also discuss implications of these multiple framings for the study and training of teacher noticing more broadly. ß