In December 1942, the Dutch Queen Wilhelmina announced, in a radio address, that the Netherlands was revising its relationship with its colonies, employing the famous words: “Relying on one’s own strength, with the will to support each other” [Steunend op eigen kracht, metde wil elkander bij te staan] (Schenk and spaan, 1945: 56). Some 52 years later, her granddaughter, Queen Beatrix, returned to this theme in a televised speech delivered to mark the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, when she referred to relations betweenThe Netherlands and its Caribbean partners as one of “a genuine relationship and mutual commitment” (een echte verwantschap en onderlinge betrokkenheid). This Charter, signed in 1954, had been drawn up to establish that henceforth the Kingdom of the Netherlands would be comprised of three equal partners: the Netherlands itself, Suriname, and the Netherlands Antilles. Back in 1954, when it was signed, the Charter was widely viewed as constituting a first, major step towards eventual independence for the Dutch partners in the Caribbean. Nor could anyone have foreseen that, 40 years later, only Suriname would have achieved independence, while the islands of the Netherlands Antilles were renouncing that option and expressing a desire to remain Dutch.

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This analysis of nation-building and nation branding in post-colonial, multi-ethnic Suriname builds on the notion that such policies are promising but also difficult to achieve in culturally divided societies. We zoom in on three episodes of nation-building and nation branding in the country and explain why and in what respects they succeeded or failed. We posit that in Suriname's case, nation-building and nation branding are intertwined, because the latter cannot be seen in isolation from nation-building. In the Conclusion, we discuss the effects of colonial legacies in multi-ethnic societies on nation-building and nation branding.

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In 1915 the Rockefeller Foundation took its hookworm eradication campaign to Suriname, but was soon disappointed because of opposition from its main target group: the Javanese. Moreover, authorities and planters objected to the construction of latrines because of the costs and their belief that the Javanese were “unhygienic”. In describing the labor migration from Java to Suriname, I show that this “lack of hygiene” was closely related to the system’s organization. I argue that uncleanliness was the consequence of harmful socio-economic and ecological conditions. Secondly I suggest that even though the Foundation did not manage to cleanse Suriname of hookworm, its educational efforts, its emphasis on prevention, and its training of local health workers probably had more impact than Rockefeller officials thought.

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