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Introduction: a new Silk Road for Central AsiaThe Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), aimed at connecting China, Europe and countries located along routes between China and Europe, was suggested by Xi Jinping in September 2013. This Chinese initiative envisages the completion of more than 100 small-and large-scale infrastructure projects that would improve China's connectivity with Western Europe via Central Asia and Russia, including roads, railroads, pipelines, industrial parks, and special economic zones. The five Central Asian states -Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan -are an important geographical focus of the project.BRI encompasses nearly half the world's population, vast resources and 40 percent of global GDP (gross domestic product). As of 2017, 68 countries -including the Central Asian states -had expressed an interest in joining BRI. The plan is that the infrastructure will be accompanied by large-scale investment from Chinese companies and institutions such as the Silk Road Foundation with funds of US$40 billion, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) with funds of US$100 billion. In addition, Beijing plans to provide development aid to the countries that participate in BRI.There has been a steady increase in the influence of China in Central Asia since the early 1990s (Indeo 2017, p. 37). The total trade turnover between China and Central Asia grew 60-fold between 1991 and 2016, from US$500,000 million to 30 billion, excluding significant informal trade by small-scale entrepreneurs. Currently, 23,000 students from Central Asia study in China and more than 700,000 people travelled between Central Asia and China in 2015 (Forbes 2017a). Because of BRI, China is likely to remain the biggest investor in the region in the future, far exceeding the potential economic footprint of Russia and the West (Laruelle 2018, p. xii). China has also become one of the biggest importers of Central Asian energy resources. After BRI was launched, Beijing rapidly scaled up its public diplomacy and strengthened its soft power presence, especially in education and culture, thus increasingly becoming a norm-setter in Central Asia (Dave 2018, p. 99).

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Africa has only contributed a small fraction of global greenhouse gas emissions yet faces disproportionate risks from climate change. This imbalance is one of many inequities associated with climate change and raises questions concerning the origin, distribution and thematic prioritization of funding for climate-change research on Africa. This article analyses a database comprising USD 1.51 trillion of research grants from 521 organizations around the world and covering all fields of research from 1990 to 2020. At most 3.8% of global funding for climate-change research is spent on African topicsa figure incommensurate with Africa's share of the world population and vulnerability to climate change. Moreover, institutions based in Europe and North America received 78% of funding for climate research on Africa, while African institutions received only 14.5%. Research on climate mitigation received only 17% of the funding while climate impacts and adaptation each received around 40%. Except for Egypt and Nigeria, funding supported research on former British colonies more than other African countries. The findings highlight the need to prioritise research on a broader set of climate-change issues in Africa and to increase funding for Africa-based researchers in order to strengthen African ownership of research informing African responses to climate change.

This article carries out a multisectoral qualitative analysis (MSQA) and policy integration analysis of six sectors important for climate mitigation in Southeast Asia in order to assess the status of the climate-energy nexus in the region. It concludes that Southeast Asia will be heavily affected by climate change but the mitigation efforts of the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are incommensurate with the threat they face. Their nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement are modest, they have a low proportion of renewable energy in their energy mixes, a modest target for raising the share of renewable energy and they are not likely to reach this target. The ASEAN countries have also been slow to adopt electric vehicles and to accede to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), while continuing to burn their forests, channel subsidies to fossil fuels and invest in new coal power plants. If ASEAN accelerated decarbonization, it could seize business opportunities, secure its standing in the international political system and climate justice discussions, and increase its chances of reaching the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

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Along with financing hard infrastructure projects, Beijing also promotes soft power projects in the form of peopleto-people initiatives. However, such projects are low priority within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Central Asia. The Confucius Institutes, which appear to be an important vehicle for Chinese soft power in the region, are not directly linked to BRI and were launched before and independently of BRI.

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