No abstract

The conclusion by Hartshorne and May (1928) regarding the specificity of moral behavior has been reconsidered in light of reanalyses of their data using factor analysis and Guttman's (195S) simplex model. Other studies relevant to the issue of specificity versus generality of moral behavior were also considered. The evidence indicates there is some underlying generality in moral behavior although there is still much of the variance of the honesty tests due to specific test determinants. A model is proposed to account for the findings. This model involves 2 generalization gradients: a gradient involving just the stimulus elements in a particular situation, and a gradient pertaining to verbal mediation in which certain cognitive elements are abstracted from one situation and generalized to a different and perhaps entirely new setting. Attention was given to the organizing and heuristic value of the model.

This study examined the developmental questions of when children begin to use the terms lie and truth, how they understand them, and when their understanding approaches that of adults. 150 subjects in 5 groups (nursery schoolers, preschoolers, first graders, fifth graders, and adults) were presented a series of 8 short puppet plays that systematically varied the presence of absence of the 3 prototype elements: factuality of a statement, the speaker's belief in the factuality or falsity of the statement, and the speaker's intent to deceive the listeners. The interactions of age, factuality, and belief most fully accounted for the use of the terms lie and truth. Persons at different ages differentially weighed the prototypic elements. Responses of fifth graders were transitional between those of the younger children and adults. The results are interpreted as supporting the development of definitional prototypes for these moral concepts.

Because baby walkers enable precocious locomotion in very young, otherwise prelocomotor infants, walker experience might be conceptualized in terms of early enrichment. However, walker devices prevent visual access to the moving limbs by design. Therefore, prelocomotor walker experience may be conceptualized in terms of early deprivation, reminiscent of that created in a classic series of animal experiments on the critical role of visual feedback in developing motor systems. This study analyzed motor and mental development in 109 human infants, with and without walker experience, between the ages of 6 and 15 months. Walker-experienced infants sat, crawled, and walked later than no-walker controls, and they scored lower on Bayley scales of mental and motor development. Significant effects of walker type, frequency, and timing of walker exposure were observed. Considering the injury data along with the developmental data, the authors conclude that the risks of walker use outweigh the benefits.

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