is well known for his investigation of the nature of philosophy in Greco-Roman times and his identification of many of its distinctive properties. His work on the importance of philosophy for the life of human beings has been particularly relevant. This contrasts with the emphasis that current philosophers put on theory, or "discourse" construction, to use Hadot's term, apart from whether it is relevant for human life or not. These days, philosophy, especially analytic philosophy, conceives of itself as "the disciplined pursuit of objective knowledge, and thus resembling the natural sciences" (Rorty 1999). Its role in our lives is at most indirect-if one happens to be a professional philosopher-or virtually nonexistent-as it very likely is for most people.The principles of philosophy are not what they were in the past, namely, the rules for living a flourishing life. 1 Today, one typically thinks of philosophy as a set of propositions describing 1 There have of course been modern philosophers who viewed philosophy as a way of life. For example, Descartes, Montaigne, Spinoza, and Bergson, but such cases are the exceptions that prove the rule.

Conceptual analysis has been typically recognized as a traditional methodology within analytic philosophy, but many philosophers have heavily criticized it. In contrast, the methodology of Carnapian explication has been undergoing a revival as a methodological alternative due to its revisionary aim. I will make explicit the shared structural properties and goals of Carnapian explication and the kind of conceptual analysis advanced by the advocates of the Canberra Plan. Also, I will argue that although their goal to make philosophy more scientific is desirable, they cannot achieve their goal of clearly distinguishing philosophy from science. Moreover, since traditional conceptual analysis is an element of both revisionary methodologies, it is also unable to mark a clear distinction between them. The comparison throws some light on the relationship between traditional conceptual analysis and the two revisionary methodologies, their implicit theoretical commitments and deficiencies.

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The leading assumption of this paper is that we can improve the methodology of conceptual engineering if we differentiate between the different functions of our concepts. There is a growing body of research that emphasizes the revisionist virtues of conceptual engineering against the descriptive task of conceptual analysis. Yet, it also has faced severe critiques. Among the difficulties raised are the problems of conceptual identification and continuity. That is why several philosophers are trying to resolve these problems and improve the methodology by calling attention, for example, to the functions that concepts can play. I follow this line of argument and argue that we can increase the chances of success if we also clarify and differentiate them. Identifying and assessing the relationship between functions will help us avoid confusion, inconsistencies, and possible verbal disputes. Doing this not only serves our theoretical and practical purposes but helps us reconsider the potentialities and limits of the conceptual engineering program.

It is fundamental that, in philosophy, we make sure that we are not mistaking merely verbal disputes, or “conceptual” disputes, for substantive ones. This essay presents a tripartite framework that is useful for clarifying cases where it is difficult to tell whether we are engaged in substantive or non‐substantive disputes. For this purpose, the essay offers some combinatorial possibilities between the following levels: verbal, conceptual, and objectual. We need to distinguish whether we are arguing about the world, concepts, or words to avoid talking at cross‐purposes and to recognize when our disputes are not worth the time. Distinguishing between these three levels can also throw light and guide research on conceptual engineering, metalinguistic negotiations, metaontology, and so on.