The didactic strategy of repeating a certain theoretical principle over and over again (either as a didactic strategy or as an exercise that the student must apply on himself) is ubiquitous both in Epictetus' Discourses and in the Enchiridion. However, although these techniques represent one of the most important strategies in the author's program of moral therapy, they seem to conflict with Epictetus' intellectualist conception of human agency. In this work, I aim to show that there is no such conflict, and that those techniques are necessary for his central therapeutical strategy (i.e., the demand for a critical examination of our impressions) to produce a virtuous outcome.
Las prácticas ascéticas propuestas por los estoicos romanos como vías de acceso a la vida virtuosa parecen, a primera vista, establecer un conflicto con la concepción intelectualista de la acción humana defendida por la ortodoxia estoica. Dada la función pedagógica que asumen dichas prácticas en el estoicismo romano, el interrogante acerca de su legitimidad doctrinal se vuelve inevitable, en la medida en que parecen admitir la ineficacia de la argumentación racional como vía de (auto) persuasión respecto de la axiología estoica. El objetivo del artículo consistirá entonces en analizar dichas prácticas ascéticas, a fin de demostrar que, a pesar del origen pitagórico-cínico de las mismas, no sólo no contradicen la matriz intelectualista de la psicología, sino que, por el contrario, representan un dispositivo gnoseológico central para la dinámica de la comprensión desarrollada durante ese período de la escuela.
The aim of this paper is to bring out to light the monistic cosmological foundations on which any interpretation of Stoic ethics must be constructed, articulated around the concepts of immanence and necessity.
El objetivo de este trabajo consiste en analizar dos alternativas presentes en las Disertaciones de Epicteto como posibles vías de acceso a la libertad y la eudaimonía: a) identificar nuestro querer con el querer de la divinidad; b) concentrarnos exclusivamente en aquello de "depende de nosotros". Dado que ambos caminos parecen conducir al solipsismo y la pasividad, ofreceremos una alternativa de interpretación que permite conciliar ambas estrategias con la impronta práctica que caracteriza a la ética del autor.
I try to show that Seneca's Medea provides us with two elements -which, as far as I am aware, have not received proper attention -that complement his approach to the phenomenon of anger, and which can improve our understanding of the Stoic psychology of action defended in De ira. The first element is linked to the question of whether the angry person is responsive to reasons or not; the second one concerns the question of indifference, tolerance and forgiveness, and addresses the issue of Medea's inability to conceive of a more appropriate or desirable reaction to Jason's offense than anger.
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