T his article explores how organizations balance the pressures to pursue efficiency through standardization with the need to remain responsive to local needs. The study combines rich ethnography with detailed loan data to show that both standardization and flexibility through relational ties provide substantial organizational benefits but also carry significant costs; thus, no strategy is inherently superior, and their coexistence generates the best results. Such coexistence, however, creates contradictions that must be managed. Here, I use microfinance as a strategic setting and gain analytic leverage from the random assignment across branches of loan officers who exhibit significant heterogeneity in rule enforcement styles: some enforce rules strictly, whereas others frequently bend them to respond to client needs. I find that loan officers with relational styles exercise discretion productively to enhance organizational performance. Yet their effectiveness is contingent on the presence of rule-enforcing peers, as evidenced by the significant underperformance of branches with a high concentration of officers of either type. In contrast, branches that contain discretionary diversity, or a balance between enforcement styles, perform best. This is not due to diversity per se, but because loan officers process decisions in local credit committees. Committees that contain discretionary diversity generate a productive tension that induces participants to justify decisions along broader organizational goals, thus maintaining a productive balance between standardization and flexibility. Implications for organizational theory and practice are discussed.

This in-depth, comparative case study of the creation of the small and medium enterprise credit market in Mexico explores the work of actors to craft new organizational practices, as well as the symbols that sustain institutionalization efforts. The study demonstrates that, to craft new institutional practices, individual actors engage in two distinct layers of institutional work. One entails purposefully visible, staged, scripted, and carefully documented work to suspend existing institutions and allow for experimentation as well as to legitimize new practices. The second entails invisible, undocumented work to recruit allies, find resources, experiment with new practices, coordinate strategies of action, and build political toolkits. While visible work—which is the focus of most research on institutional change—was determinant at every stage of the change process because of its symbolic effects, actors spent most of their time and energy on invisible work, which they referred to as “the real work.” The paper shows that every act of visible institutional work was crafted through considerable amounts of invisible institutional work. Since new practices and new symbols were crafted through gradual and iterative processes of experimentation, invisible work includes many failures that remain undocumented. It also includes the work of midlevel, invisible actors who, often, are the real and unreported agents of institutional change. The findings have implications for our understanding of the mechanisms of institutional maintenance and change.

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S ocial scientists have long considered what mechanisms underlie repeated exchange. Three mechanisms have garnered the majority of this attention: formal contracts, relational contracts, and relationally embedded social ties. Although each mechanism has its virtues, all three exhibit a common limitation: an inability to fully explain the continuation and stability of intertemporal exchange between individuals and organizations in the face of change. Drawing on extensive quantitative data on approximately 450,000 microfinance loans made by a microfinance institution in Mexico from 2004 to 2008 that include random assignment of loan officers, this research proposes the concept of "relational styles" to help explain how repeated exchange is possible in the face of personnel change. We define relational styles as systematically reoccurring patterns of interaction employed by social actors within and across exchange relationships-in this paper, between microfinance clients and loan officers. We show that relational styles that are consistent facilitate a clear understanding of expectations and thus exchange. We also demonstrate that consistency in the relational styles followed by successive loan officers mitigates the negative impact of a broken loan officer-client tie. This paper thus proposes and empirically tests a social mechanism based on relational styles that often accompanies relational embeddedness, but which may also serve as a partial substitute for it.

This article explores how loan officers enact and adapt organizational policies within microfinance institutions. Some loan officers frequently bend or choose not to enforce written rules in an effort to better address client needs, while others enforce the rules strictly. These differences in enforcement styles are analyzed to explore the structural characteristics that generate and sustain rule‐bending behavior. In microfinance, the pressures to standardize and automate lending decisions challenge loan officers' ability to manage clients because context uncertainty cannot be fully captured by centralized policies. The article shows that officers exercise discretion productively, as measured by the organization's own criteria to (i) better serve client needs when policies can lead to bad outcomes; (ii) purposefully improve the rules themselves; and (iii) defend loan officer status within the organization. The article unveils two inherent tensions in microfinance. First, increased efforts to centralize and enforce policies in fact only increase the motivation for loan officers to work outside the organization's regulations. Second and ironically, the value of the productive rule bending displayed by some loan officers is best captured when other officers are strict enforcers.