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Divide the decision-maker's future into: (i) a pre-outcome period (lasting from the decision until the outcome of that decision is known), and (ii) a sequel post-outcome period (beginning when the outcome becomes known). Anticipated emotions in both periods may influence the decision, in particular, with regard to an outcome that matters to the person, the enjoyable tension from not yet knowing what this outcome will be. In the experiments presented, lottery choice can be explained by this attraction to chance, and cannot be explained by either convex von Neumann-Morgenstern utility, or by rank-dependent risk-loving weights: attraction to chance is a separate motivator. Copyright Verein fü Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000.

At the point of choice, let N be the delay in learning the outcome. Then von Neumann and Morgenstern's postulates contradictorily imply that N = 0 and N > 0. As a consequence, Savage's 'sure-thing' proof, which has bestowed on expected utility theory most of its normative appeal, depends on inconsistent assumptions. Further, the validity of Savage's proof cannot be retrieved by minimizing N > 0, by making the delay a mere moment or so. The historical origins of these contradictions are traced to (i) von Neumann and Morgenstern inadvertently limiting their risk model to the certain period, that is the period after gamblers learn the outcome(s), and (ii) Savage's use of the sure-thing principle for analysing "atemporally but also quite formally" compound gambles [Savage, 1954, p. 23].

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