Insurance is a business in which trust is the corollary of risk taking. One problem for the insurance industry in eighteenth and early nineteenth-century Britain was how to bridge the gap between the world of business based upon personal trust, and the emergence of new commercial relations where moral hazard was mass produced and where a commanding knowledge of personal reputations was virtually impossible. This paper examines the imperfect methods devised by early life and fire insurance offices to assess both physical and moral hazard and postulates a relationship between the two. The responses to two particular moral hazard “problems” identified by contemporary underwriters–insurance by the Jews and the Irish–are explored.
There has been a recent shift in the historiography of the modern British economy towards an emphasis on the success of the service sector. This article examines one criterion of success, namely innovation, in British insurance between 1700 and 1914. Factors determining innovation are surveyed and comparisons drawn with European insurance. The relevance of existing models of industrial innovation is challenged and a new model is constructed for insurance. This model suggests that insurance innovation ran broadly counter‐cyclical to innovation in industry during this period, and was relatively undynamic. The article concludes by speculating about the relationship between industrial growth, liquidity constraints, and innovation in insurance.
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